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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by 
the Fourth Judicial District Court on the 27th of October, 
1987 (Record 140-143), and jurisdiction is conferred upon this 
Court pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Plaintiffs Fitzgerald filed a complaint (Record 1-16) 
for slander of title to remove two notices of interest record-
ed by the defendants. The defendants filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim (Record 31-36). The case was tried by the Court 
sitting without a jury on October 24, 1985. Further hearings 
were heard on October 24, 1986, November 6, 1986, and Septem-
ber 18, 1987. The trial court entered judgment (Addendum No. 
1) removing the notices of interest, but did not award damag-
es, and ordering the plaintiffs Fitzgerald to deliver deeds to 
real property to defendants Corbett and Gurr and to five pur-
chasers of properties from Corbett and Gurr who were not par-
ties to the action. The court also entered Amended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Addendum 2). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is the Settlement Agreement of September 10, 
1982, enforceable? 
2. Were the provisions of the Settlement Agreement 
requiring Fitzgeralds to honor past sales of Corbett and Gurr 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata? 
3. Is the Settlement Agreement of September 10, 
1982, vague and ambiguous, and thus unenforceable? 
4. Did the trial court err in ordering the delivery 
of deeds to third parties and to counterclaimants Corbett and 
Gurr? 
5. Did the trial court err in failing to award dam-
ages for the slander of title? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is the third time that litigation between plain-
tiffs, Fitzgerald, and defendants, Corbett and Gurr, have come 
before the Supreme Court. The first two times it came before 
this Court, Corbett and Gurr appeared as the plaintiffs and 
appellants; this time, Fitzgeralds appear as plaintiffs and 
appellants. To avoid the confusion between the designations, 
this writer will refer to the parties by their surnames, 
"Fitzgeralds11 meaning Leland A. Fitzgerald and Helen Fitzger-
ald, and "Corbett and Gurr" meaning Boyd Corbett and Keith 
Gurr. 
The facts and issues in this case are interwoven with 
the prior litigation. Therefore, this statement of facts must 
of necessity provide background for the issues raised by this 
appeal. 
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Commencing in January. 1977. Fitzgeralds began ac-
quiring property in Cedar Valley. Utah, from a variety of 
sellers. By February 1. 1977. the first contractual agree-
ments were entered into between Fitzgeralds and Corbett and 
Gurr. A somewhat lengthy description of the business dealings 
between the parties is set forth in the Memorandum Decision in 
the first litigation (Exhibit No. 10. Addendum No. 3). Those 
dealings included Earnest Money Receipts and Offers to Pur-
chase. Uniform Real Estate Contracts, and Options, several in 
number. The parties came into dispute over payments and 
amounts owed under the various agreements, and the purported 
exercise of the options, and in 1981. Corbett and Gurr com-
menced suit against the Fitzgeralds in the Fourth District 
Court. Civil No. 50,224. the matter was tried before Judge J. 
Robert Bullock, sitting without a jury. On May 4, 1982, Judge 
Bullock rendered a Memorandum Decision (Exhibit 10. Addendum 
3). 
On May 17. 1982. Corbett and Gurr filed a notice of 
appeal from that Memorandura Decision, in Supreme Court case 
No. 18529. On June 25. 1982. Judge Bullock entered Judgment 
on the Memorandum Decision (Exhibit 1, Addendum 4). On June 
29, 1982, Corbett and Gurr filed an additional notice of ap-
peal in Supreme Court case No. 18594. 
The judgment entered by Judge Bullock awarded judg-
ment in favor of Corbett and Gurr against Fitzgeralds in the 
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amount of $4,709.96 (paragraph 1, Judgment, Addendum 4), but 
ruled that Corbett and Gurr had no interest in the properties 
described in the judgment. On September 9, 1982, Fitzgeralds 
gave Corbett and Gurr credit on a payment past due on a con-
tract dated September 1, 1977. which was not part of the liti-
gation before Judge Bullock (Exhibit 14, Addendum 5). Corbett 
and Gurr signed a release of that judgment on September 28, 
982 (Exhibit No. 13, Addendum No. 6). 
On September 10. 1982. the parties entered into a 
Settlement Agreement (Exhibit No. 11, Addendum No. 11). On 
October 4. 1982, Corbett and Gurr made payment of $48,720.79 
and received additional credits on the contract not involved 
in the pending matter (Exhibits No. 21, 22, and 23, Addenda 8, 
9, and 10). 
On November 1, 1982, this Court, on motion of respon-
dents for dismissal of the appeals with prejudice, granted 
dismissal of the appeals in both 18529 and 18594 (Exhibit No. 
4, Addendum No. 11). 
On November 1. 1982. Boyd Corbett, doing business as 
Utah Ranchlands. filed and recorded a notice of interest (Ex-
hibit No. 2, Addendum No. 12). 
November 26, 1982. a further hearing was held before 
Judge Bullock in the trial court (Exhibit No. 26, Addendum No. 
13) . 
On January 6, 1983, additional hearings were held 
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before Judge Bullock (Exhibit No. 27, Addendum No. 14). 
On April 19, 1983. Judge Bullock rendered and Order 
and Judgment (Exhibit No. 5. Addendum No. 15). 
On May 17. 1983. Corbett and Gurr filed a new appeal 
in the matter pending before Judge Bullock (Exhibit 28. Adden-
dum 16). from the April 19. 1983, order. 
In the new appeal. Corbett and Gurr raised the issue 
of whether or not Fitzgeralds had made an open court offer to 
honor prior sales of Corbett and Gurr. which the Court speci-
fically declined in its order and judgment of April 19. 1983 
(Exhibit No. 5. Addendum No. 15). 
On April 18. 1984. Corbett filed and recorded an 
additional notice of interest (Exhibit No. 3. Addendum No. 
17). On November 1. 198^ the Supreme Court rendered a 
decision in that appeal (Record 59:63, Addendum 17). 
On May 26. 1983, after the notice of appeal had been 
filed in the case pending before Judge Bullock, Fitzgeralds 
brought suit to remove the notice of interest and for damages 
for slander of title by the filing of the notice of interest 
by Boyd Corbett and Utah Ranchlands, a partnership of Boyd 
Corbett and Keith Gurr. 
The appeal from the judgment rendered in that case is 
the matter now before this Court. 
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POINT I 
The Trial Court Erred in Holding the Settle-
ment Agreement Was Enforceable Because the 
Conditions of the Agreement Were Not Met. 
After Corbett and Gurr had lost the case they brought 
against the Fitzgeralds. Civil No. 50.224. tried by Judge 
Bullock, and after they had filed their appeals in that pro-
ceeding (Supreme Court Nos. 18529 and 18594). counsel for 
Corbett and Gurr failed to file a brief on appeal, as required 
by the Rules of the Supreme Court (Record. Supreme Court cases 
18529 and 18594). 
That case involved a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
dated May 13. 1977, an Earnest Money Agreement and Option to 
Purchase dated February 1. 1977. and an Option dated September 
7. 1977 (Exhibit No. 1. Addendum No. 4). Corbett and Gurr 
also had a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated September 1. 
1977. with Fitzgeralds which, at that time, was still in force 
and effect. The Sepember 1. 1977. Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract was not a part of Judge Bullock's decision and the Su-
preme Court cases 18529 and 18594 (Record: 312:24-25 and 
313:1-6. testimony of Lee A. Fitzgerald: Record: 281:7-13. 
testimony of Boyd Corbett). 
On September 10. 1982. while the two appeals were 
pending in the Supreme Court, the parties entered into an 
agreement denominated as Settlement Agreement (Exhibit No. 11. 
Addendum 7). That Agreement and its enforceability is the 
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subject matter of this appeal. 
A. Failure to pay $49,000+ on September 10. 1982. 
The next to last sentence of that Settlement 
Agreement provides: 
This Agreement subject to payment in excess 
of $49,000 on the DuPratt contract on this 
10th day of September. 1982 (emphasis added). 
As stated in Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk. 321 
P.2d 221. 7 Utah 2d 163 (1958): 
...the fundamental concepts in regard to 
contracts: that their purpose is to reduce 
to writing the conditions upon which the 
minds of the parties have met and to fix 
their rights and duties in respect thereto. 
The intent so expressed is to be found, if 
possible, within the four corners of the 
instrument itself in accordance with the 
ordinary accepted meaning of the words 
used... Generally speaking, neither of the 
parties, nor the court has any right to ig-
nore or modify conditions which are clearly 
expressed merely because it may subject one 
of the parties to hardship, but they must be 
enforced "in accordance with the intention as 
*** manifested by the language used by the 
parties to the contract.11 
ID at 166. 
That statement was again affirmed by the Court in 
Jones v. Acme Building Products. Inc.. 450 P.2d 743. 22 Utah 
2d 202 (1969). at page 206. 
Whether the above quoted portion of the Settlement 
Agreement is a condition of the contract is to be taken from 
the fair reading of the Agreement. In Cheever v. Schramm. 577 
P.2d 951 (1977). the Court said: 
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The intention to create a condition in a 
contract must appear expressly or by clear 
implication. 
Id. at 953. 
That was reiterated in Creer v. Thurman. 581 P.2d 149 
(1978). where the Court said: 
Whether a provision in a contract is a condi-
tion, the nonfulfillment of which excuses 
performance, depends upon the intent of th 
prties. to be ascerained from a fair and 
reasonable construction of the language used 
in light of all the circumstances when they 
executed the contract. 
id. at 151. 
It is also supported in Porter v. Groover. 734 P.2d 
464 (1987). where the Court said: 
Whether a promise is conditional depends upon 
the parties* intent, which is derived from a 
fair and reasonable construction of the lan-
guage used in light of all the circumstances 
when the parties executed the contract. 
Id. at 465. 
The Settlement Agreement (Exhibit No. 11. Addendum 
No. 7). shows that after spelling out. in three paragraphs, 
respective responsibilities under the Settlement Agreement, 
the parties said "This Agreement is subject to payment in 
excess of $49,000 on the DuPratt contract on this 10th day of 
September. 1982. Clearly, upon the language drawn by the 
signers of the agreement itself, the Settlement Agreement was 
conditioned upon payment of the $49,000 on that specific date. 
The circumstances under which that was included on 
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Exhibit 11, are as follows: 
Q: (to Leland Fitzgerald): What was the 
reason for including in Exhibit 11 the refer-
ence to the payment of the $49,000? 
A: I was in a real bad financial bind on 
some property and I needed money real bad and 
I told Mr. Corbett to try to resolve this and 
he come out and this is what we resolved. 
(Record 317:23-25, 318:1-3) 
That the condition was not met is borne out by the 
testimony of all of the parties to this litigation. Mr. Cor-
bett admitted that the $49,000 was not paid on September 10, 
1982. as required by the Settlement Agreement (Record 
283:19-25, 284:1-8). Corbett further agreed that the Settle-
ment Agreement was subject to payment on that date. He was 
asked: 
Q: And he entered into this Agreement and it 
specifically provided that it was subject to 
paying the excess of that payment in excess 
of $49,000 on September 10, 1982? 
A: Yes. 
(Record 284:22-25, 285:1). 
Mr. Gurr stated: 
Q: You know for a fact that you didn't pay 
the $49,000 on the 10th of September, don't 
you? 
A: No I don't. 
Q: You don't know that? 
A: I don't know that. Whenever the check 
was made out or whenever the cashier's check 
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was made out. that's when it was paid and the 
records will show that date, and I donft know 
when it was. 
Q: If it was paid on October 4. then that's 
what the record will show. 
A: Sure. 
(Record 314:3-13). 
Exhibit No. 21 shows that the payment of the 
$49,551.70 was credited by three credits given to Corbett and 
Gurr and a payment of $48,720.79 on October 4. 1982. Exhibit 
No. 22 shows that that payment of $48,720.79 was then paid by 
Mr. Fitzgerald on the indebtedness about which he testified on 
the DuPratt contract on October 6. 1982. Exhibit No. 23 shows 
the record of payment and shows that the 1982 payment on that 
contract was paid on October 4. 1982. 57 days late. No evi-
dence was offered by Corbett and Gurr to dispute that the 
payment was paid on October 4. 1982. and not on September 10. 
1982 as required by Exhibit No. 11 (Addendum No. 7). 
In Bentley v. Potter. 694 P.2d 617 (1984). the Court 
said: 
Failure of consideration exists "wherever one 
who has either given or promised to give some 
performance fails without his fault to re-
ceive in some material respect the agreed 
exchange for that performance." 
Id. at 619. 
That position on failure of consideration is quoted 
again in Copper State Leasing v. Blacker Appliance & Furni-
ture. 90 U.A.R. 23. August 31. 1988. at page 25. 
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Fitzgeralds were not at fault in the failure of Cor-
bett and Gurr to make that $49,000 payment on September 10, 
1982. There is a failure of consideration for that Settlement 
Agreement. A condition to it was that the payment of the 
$49,000 owed under the September 7. 1977. contract be paid on 
that date, the 10th of September, 1982. The testimony was 
admitted by Corbett and Gurr that the payment was to be made 
on that date, and that payment was not made on that date. 
Thus there is a failure of consideration. 
B. Failure to Terminate Legal Proceedings. 
The Settlement Agreement (Addendum No. 7) reads: 
We G. Boyd Corbett and Keith L. Gurr, doing 
business at Utah Ranchlands. hereby agree to 
settle all legal actions, lawsuits, appeals 
to the Supreme Court, etc., concerning Leland 
A. and Helen S. Fitzgerald and all their 
Cedar Valley property. 
The factual circumstances are that they did not 
settle all of their lawsuits. The dismissal of the pending 
appeals was not occasioned by acts of Corbett and Gurr. but it 
was dismissed on the respondents1 motion for dismissal of the 
appeals, with prejudice, which was granted on November 1, 1982 
(Exhibit No. 4, Addendum No. 11). The Record of the Supreme 
Court in cases 18529 and 18594 will show that in pursuance of 
the Settlement Agreement, Corbett & Gurr did not initiate any 
dismissal of their appeals. 
In addition to failing to dismiss their appeals in 
the underlying proceeding (Civil No. 50,224, District Court of 
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Utah County) presided over by Judge J. Robert Bullock, upon 
which judgment had been entered June 24. 1982 (Exhibit No. 1, 
Addendum No. 4), Corbett and Gurr continued to pursue the 
matter, as is demonstrated by Exhibit No. 26, a minute entry 
of November 26, 1982 and the minute entry. Exhibit No. 27, 
wherein the Court said: 
The Court will also hear arguments, if any, 
as to whether or not the Court should, on its 
own initiative, amend the judgment with re-
spect to the offer of defendants, Lee A. 
Fitzgerald and Helen Fitzgerald, referred to 
in the Court* s memorandum decision of May 4, 
1982. 
After hearing the matter. Judge Bullock entered an 
Order and Judgment (Exhibit No. 5, Addendum No. 15), wherein 
the Court said: 
1. Plaintiffs [Corbett and Gurr] allege that 
the Court erred in its judgment entered June 
25, 1982, by failing to order defendant, Lee 
Fitzgerald, to perform according to his offer 
to honor contracts between plaintiffs and 
innocent purchasers of property covered under 
May 13, 1978 contracts. 
Language in the memorandum decision entered 
May 4, 1982, which apparently created the 
ambiguity as to whether or not the Court 
intended to so order, was included in the 
decision to encourage the defendant to per-
form according to his unsolicited offer so as 
to minimize litigation and avoid further loss 
and damage to innocent purchasers. However, 
defendant's offer had no bearing whatsoever 
on the decision entered by the Court, the 
decision was not conditioned thereon, and the 
Court did not intend to assume responsibility 
for supervising defendant's performance ac-
cording to the offer. The Court, therefore 
declines to alter its judgment on the basis 
that the alleged omission constituted error, 
oversight, or mistake. 
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Thereafter, Corbett and Gurr filed an appeal of that 
Order and Judgment (Exhibit No, 28. Addendum No. 16)- They 
pursued then the very issues that they now pursue in this 
proceeding, as is demonstrated by Exhibit No. 25, their brief 
filed on appeal. Almost two thirds of that brief addressed 
the issues germane to the original judgment. Specifically. 
Corbett and Gurr addressed, at page 21 of their brief, the 
issue of the so-called agreement to honor their prior con-
tracts with third parties, which is carried forward on pages 
22 and 23 of the brief. Attached to it was the very Settle-
ment Agreement at issue in this proceeding. That appeal cul-
minated in the decision of this Court, in Corbett v. Fitzger-
ald. 709 P.2d 384 (1985) (Addendum No. 18). 
The trial court in this case should have ruled that 
there was a failure of consideration when Corbett and Gurr 
breached conditions of the Settlement Agreement by failing to 
settle their legal actions, lawsuits, and appeals but contin-
ued to pursue them thereafter. As stated in VanDyke v. Moun-
tain Coin Mach. Distrib, Court of Appeals of Utah, August 3, 
1988. 758 P.2d 962 (1988). 
Thus, Mountain Coin proceeded with the law-
suit despite consummation of the parties1 
agreement resolving the lawsuit. 
Id. at 964. 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court in 
that proceeding did not err in directing a verdict that Moun-
-13-
tain Coin had breached the settlement agreement. 
In the case now at bar. the trial court erred in not 
ruling that Corbett and „_ Gurr had breached the Settlement 
Agreement by continuing their litigaton. 
By the time of the final ruling in this matter, the 
Supreme Court had ruled in 1985 in the former matter. The 
Court's ruling was submitted as a supplement to the record 
(Record, pages 59-63). 
The trial court should have ruled that Corbett and 
Gurr had breached the Settlement Agreement by continuing their 
litigation, and that this barred any further rights to claim 
benefits under the Settlement Agreement. 
C. Failure to make payment on tender of $11,000 
payment. 
The defendants breached the Settlement Agreement 
by failing to make payment or tender of payment of the $11,000 
required by paragraph 3 of the Settlement Agreement (Addendum 
No. 7). Mr. Gurr was asked about that payment. The Agreement 
called for $11,000 paid in three annual installments of $3,667 
plus interest at seven percent, commencing February 1. 1983. 
Mr. Gurr was asked: 
Q: If I understand you correctly, with re-
gard to the $11,000. you never took the 
$3,667 to him plus the interest on those 
payments as those payments became due. 
A: No. but we talked about it. 
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Q: You never did tender the $11,000 in by 
handing him a check for the $11,000? 
A: No, because he never did proceed to honor 
these contracts like he ajjreed to do. 
(Record 313:7-11, 15-18) 
In answer to a question by the Court about the 
$11,000. Mr. Corbett said: 
Thank you, your Honor. So basically the 
answer to your question, the $11,000, we 
never did offer payment. I never did. Now 
my partner Keith Gurr could have. I did not. 
(Record, 265:15-18) 
Mr. Fitzgerald corroborated their testimony when he 
was asked: 
Q: My question was, did anyone ever tender 
any payment of the $3,667 that was to paid on 
February 1 of the following year? 
A: No. 
Q: Did they ever pay anything on the con-
tract? 
A: No. 
Q: Did they ever offer to pay anything on 
the agreement? 
A: No. 
(Record 325:5-14) 
Under the Settlement Agreement, Corbett and Gurr were 
to have paid $11,000 commencing February 1, 1983, in three 
annual installments of $3,667. For that, they were to receive 
320 acres to be deeded to them as received by Fitzgerald from 
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the persons from whom he was purchasing the same property. 
Nowhere in the Record did Corbett and Gurr ever pro-
duce evidence that they had made an x>frfer to pay the sum owed 
under the Settlement Agreement. If they had made an offer in 
writing of a particular sum, delivered to Fitzgerald, it would 
be equivalent to the actual production or tender of money. 
But both have testified that they did not make any such tender 
of payment. 70A-2-511, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
pertaining to tender of payment under the Commercial Code, 
provides, in part, that unless agreed otherwise, a tender of 
payment is a condition to the seller's duty to tender and 
complete any delivery. 
As stated in Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 
P.2d 1319 (1975), 
A tender requires that there be a bona fide, 
unconditional, offer of payment of the amount 
of money due, coupled with an actual produc-
tion of the money or its equivalent (emphasis 
added). 
The Court went on to say: 
But there was no actual tender of the amounts 
due under the contract within the foregoing 
definition... 
Unless there is some showing of legal excuse 
or justification for failure to perform he 
obligations of a contract, it must be en-
forced according to its terms. 
Id. at 1322. 
That statement has not been changed, and was reaf-
firmed in LHIW. Ind., v. DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961 (1988). 
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D. Consideration for the settlement agreement. 
While it might be argued that the $49,000 pay-
ment required to be made on September 10, 1982, could not 
constitute consideration for the Settlement Agreement, as it 
was already obligated and past due under the September 1, 
1977, Uniform Real Estate Contract on which Corbett and Gurr 
were delinquent with their payment, nevertheless it could be 
argued that their agreement to settle all legal actions, law-
suits and appeals concerning Leland and Helen Fitzgerald and 
the payment of $11,000 in three annual installments of $3,667 
commencing February 1, 1983, do constitute consideration for 
the Settlement Agreement of Leland and Helen Fitzgerald to 
deed Corbett and Gurr the 320 acres and to honor Corbett and 
Gurr's previous sales. Nevertheless, the failure of consider-
ation in failing to pay the $49,000 when required by the con-
dition of the Settlement Agreement on September 10, 1982, and 
the failure to drop their legal proceedings and instead pursu-
ing those trial court proceedings on November 26 and January 
6. their Notice of Appeal, Exhibit No. 28. their brief filed 
on appeal. Exhibit 29, and the ultimate decision of the Court, 
Exhibit 5, rendered on April 19, 1983, and the decision in 
Corbett and Gurr v. Fitzgerald. 109 P.2d 384 (1985) together 
with their failure to make the payments of $11,000 as required 
by the Settlement Agreement, all demonstrate that there was a 
failure of consideration on the part of Corbett and Gurr. 
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Thus, the Settlement Agreement is not enforceable, and this 
Court should so rule. 
As stated in DeMentas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 
628 (1988), 
In a contract action in this state, consider-
ation or a legally sufficient substitute for 
consideration must be established as part of 
plaintiff1s prima facie case. 
Id. at 632. 
Corbett and Gurr did not establish their prima facie 
case of the consideration having been met for the enforcement 
of the Settlement Agreement. The trial court erred in holding 
that the Settlement Agreement was enforceable. 
POINT II 
The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Rule that 
the Issue of Honoring Defendants1 Contracts 
with Third Parties Was Res Judicata. 
After the judgment in the original proceeding brought 
by Corbett and Gurr against Lee and Helen Fitzgerald (plain-
tiffs* Exhibit No. 1, Addendum No. 4), and after the appeals 
of those matters were dismissed (plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 4, 
Addendum No. 11) on motion of the respondents, further hear-
ings were held (Exhibit No. 26). Thereafter, the trial court 
judge, J. Robert Bullock, entered an Order, specifically with 
regard to the so-called oral agreement in open court to honor 
contracts with third parties. 
Paragraph 1 of that Order specifically rules that the 
open court statement was not intended to be a binding agree-
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ment to honor the contracts of Corbett and Gurr to third par-
ties. Nevertheless, plaintiffs submitted to the Court a par-
tial transcript of that open court statement as Exhibit 9. 
Following Judge Bullocks ruling. Corbett and Gurr 
filed a Notice of Appeal (Exhibit 28, Addendum No. 16). In 
the pursuit of that appeal, they filed a brief on appeal which 
is a part of this record as Exhibit No. 29. Point 5 of that 
brief asserts that the open court statement should be made a 
part of the final judgment. Attached to that brief was a copy 
of the Settlement Agreement. Exhibit No. 11. the very agree-
ment in issue by the counterclaim of Corbett and Gurr. 
This Court has spoken on a number of occasions on the 
doctrine of res judicata and its two branches of claim preclu-
sion and issue preclusion. One of the more complete state-
ments is found in Searle Bros, v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689 (1978). 
wherein the Court set forth the four elements of the collater-
al estoppel doctrine, which is now identified as issue preclu-
sion. 
That decision was reaffirmed in a decision involving 
the plaintiff in this case, handed down in August. 1988. in 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch. 758 P.2d 451 (1988). 
wherein the Court of Appeals set forth the distinction between 
claim preclusion and issue preclusion. The Court therein 
points out that the first branch of res judicata is known as 
"claim preclusion." 
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Under claim preclusion, the most recent decision this 
writer has found is the case of Madsen v. Borthick. decided 
December 12, 1988. 97 U.A.R. 13. wherein the Court said: 
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only 
if the suit in which that cause of action is 
being asserted and the prior suit satisfy 
three requirements. First, both cases must 
involve the same parties or their privies. 
Second. the claim that is alleged to be 
barred must have been presented in the first 
suit or must be one that could and should 
have been raised in the first action. Third, 
the first suit must have resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits. 
Id. at 14. 
In this case, all four parties (Corbett and Gurr and 
Lee and Helen Fitzgerald) were the same parties; the claim 
was alleged during that proceeding and should have been pre-
sented in that proceeding; and the issue resulted in a final 
judgment (Exhibit No. 1, Addendum No. 4). Initially, the 
appeal in that case was dismissed on motion of the respondents 
for failure of the plaintiffs to file a brief on appeal (Exhi-
bit No. 4 in this proceeding). After additional hearings, the 
case was appealed again, and the final decision was rendered 
in Corbett and Gurr v. Fitzgerald, supra, wherein the Court 
directed itself to the judgments rendered and which were the 
subject matters of the first two appeals. Nos. 18529 and 
18594. Thus, the Court declined to consider those original 
appeal issues, inasmuch as those issues were dismissed with 
prejudice. 
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Thus, under claim preclusion, the claims now asserted 
concerning the open court offer are barred. 
The second avenue for consideration is the second leg 
of the doctrine of res judicata, being what was formerly 
called collateral estoppel and is now called issue preclusion. 
The four elements of issue preclusion were set forth 
in Searle Bros.. supra, but are further identified in Trimble, 
supra, involving, coincidentally, a second trial of a claim 
brought against Lee Fitzgerald, the plaintiff in this proceed-
ing. In that case, the Court of Appeals identified the four 
elements of issue preclusion and defined them specifically on 
page 454. They were reiterated by this Court in Noble v. 
Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (1988), and in Madsen, supra. 
Applying the doctrine of issue preclusion to the 
facts of this case, the brief of appellants Corbett and Gurr 
in the appeal of the case, tried by Judge Bullock, Supreme 
Court No. 19225, the Court specifically found that the assign-
ments of error in plaintiffs' brief, namely, the claimed 
errors of the trial court in not including the alleged open 
court agreement of Lee and Helen Fitzgerald to honor the con-
tracts of Corbett and Gurr with third parties (pages 21-23 of 
their brief) are barred. The Court said: 
The assignments of error in plaintiffs1 brief 
are directed toward the original judgments, 
the same judgments from which plaintiffs 
appealed in Corbett v. Fitzgerald, numbers 
18529 and 18594. supra. This Court declines 
now to consider those original appeal issues. 
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inasmuch as those issues and their appeals 
were dismissed with prejudice. The order to 
show cause hearings held subsequent to plain-
tiffs' original appeals to this Court do not 
provide an occasion for plaintiffs to now 
appeal the results of those hearings and 
include in the instant appeal those issues 
that were raised and dismissed in the origi-
nal appeals. The express ruling by this 
Court on all issues raised by the prior 
appeals is binding upon the parties. the 
trial court and this court. C & J Indus-
tries. Inc. v. Bailey. 669 P.2d 855. 856 
(1983). Plaintiffs1 claims of error as to 
the original judgments were dismissed by this 
Court with prejudice. That dismissal consti-
tutes an affirmance of the original judg-
ments, and they are not subject to further 
attack in a subsequent appeal.... Plaintiffs 
accepted the sum of $4,709.96 from defendants 
I [Leland Fitzgerald and Helen Fitzgerald] 
and released their judgment against them. 
That judgment is therefore not reviewable on 
appeal. (emphasis added) 
Id. at 386. 
In the proceeding now before the Court (Exhibit No. 
14. Addendum No. 5) shows that on September 9. 1982. the day 
before the so-called Settlement Agreement was executed. Leland 
Fitzgerald gave a receipt and credit of $4,709.96 against the 
September 1. 1977. contract payment of $54,261.03. leaving a 
balance of $49,551.70. The $49,551.70 is shown to have been 
credited on Exhibit No. 21 as payment on the September 1. 
1977. contract. 
That was a satisfied judgment and is not reviewable 
on appeal. Corbett and Gurr attempt in this proceeding to 
claim that the open court offer. Exhibit No. 9 in this pro-
ceeding, is somehow tied to this proceeding as a clarification 
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of tfie Settlement Agreement, Exhibit No, 11. By so doing, 
Corbett and Gurr are attempting to secure the inclusion of 
that prior issue despite the Court's ruling that the issue was 
not reviewable on appeal. 
This Court should not countenance such a back door 
approach to inclusion of an issue already ruled upon by this 
Court as being nonreviewable. The Court should hold that the 
claim that the Fitzgeralds should honor the contracts of Cor-
bett and Gurr with third parties is barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata. 
POINT III 
The Doctrines of Interpretation of Contracts 
as Applied to the Evidence Presented Preclude 
the Trial Court's Ruling that the Settlement 
Agreement Was Enforceable. 
On the issue of the interpretation of contracts, 
three decisions of note should be considered. In Provo City 
Corporation v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803 (1979), this 
Court said: 
In interpreting the contract in question, 
this Court deals with a question of law. As 
such, the same deference need not be accorded 
the lower court's position as we would accord 
findings of fact. 
Id. at 805. 
In Walter E. Heller v. U.S. Rock Wool Co., 762 P.2d 
1104 (1988), the Court of Appeals of Utah said: 
Questions of contract intepretation. 
such as this, are questions of law to 
which we owe no deference but review for 
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correctness. Ted R. Brown and Assocs. 
v. Carnes Corp,, 753 P.2d 964 (1988). 
id. at 1105. 
And in Power Sys. & Controls v. Keith's Elec, 765 
P.2d 5 (1988). the Court of Appeals of Utah said: 
It is well-settled that if a trial court 
interprets a contract as a matter of law, the 
trial court's interpretation is afforded no 
particular deference on appeal... However, 
when a contract is ambiguous because of un-
certainty or incompleteness concerning the 
parties' rights and duties under the con-
tract, extrinsic evidence is permissible to 
ascertain the parties' intent. 
Id. at 9-10. 
The primary issue in this appeal is that the trial 
court ordered the plaintiffs to deliver deeds to "honor" con-
tracts entered into between the defendants, Corbett and Gurr, 
and third parties. 
During closing argument of the trial of the former 
proceeding, counsel for the Fitzgeralds, prior to May 4, 1982, 
made an offer to the court to honor legitimate contracts Cor-
bett and Gurr had entered into with third parties. That is 
referred to on page 12 of the Memorandum Decision of Judge 
Bullock dated May 4, 1982 (Exhibit No. 10, Addendum No. 3). 
Plaintiffs attempted during the trial of the matter 
now at bar to use that open court statement as a basis for 
interpretation of the meaning of the phrase in the Settlement 
Agreement (Exhibit No. 11, Addendum No. 7) that said "Fitzger-
alds agree to honor all Corbett and Gurr's previous sales." 
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Even though the open court statement was made more than four 
months prior to the Settlement Agreement. In applying the 
rules of interpretation, this Court has stated: 
The test to be applied is, would the meaning 
be plain to a person of ordinary intelligence 
and understanding viewing the matter fairly 
and reasonably in accordance with the usual 
and natural meaning of the words and in light 
of the existing circumstances. 
Auto Lease Company v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., 7 Utah 2d 
336, 325 P.2d 264 (1958). 
At no place in the pleadings or in the evidence did 
counsel for Corbett and Gurr, or they themselves, assert that 
the wording of the Settlement Agreement was ambiguous. While 
it is well settled that if a contract is ambiguous, extrinsic 
evidence as to the parties1 intent must be received and con-
sidered in an effort to glean what the parties actually agreed 
to, this requires the taking of evidence and the making of 
factual findings. Hornsby v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop, 
Court of Appeals of the State of Utah, July 8, 1988, 758 P.2d 
723. 
As stated in LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance 
Co., October, 1988, 94 U.A.R. 16: 
A cardinal rule in construing the contract is 
to give effect to the intentions of the par-
ties and, if possible, these intentions 
should be gleaned from an examination of the 
text of the contract itself. 
In testimony, Boyd Corbett stated that when the Set-
tlement Agreement was prepared and signed, Keith Gurr was not 
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present (Record 280:17-24). Nowhere in the testimony of Boyd 
Corbett was any explanation given as to the intent of the 
parties of the expression in the Settlement Agreement "Fitz-
geralds agree to honor all Corbett and Gurr's previous sales." 
Apparently, Corbett and Gurr's counsel intended to 
show that the prior open court statement explained the intent 
of the parties some four months later and it was so indicated 
in the Findings of Fact. The Court made a Finding No. 20 that 
the quotation in open court in the earlier proceeding before 
Judge Bullock is a basis for the background of an interpreta-
tion of the Exhibit 11. However, that cannot be the basis of 
it. first, because it was not contemporaneous with the prepar-
ation of the Settlement Agreement. Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court ruling that addressed that issue in the second appeal 
and in the ruling of April 19. 1983. by Judge Bullock (Exhibit 
No. 5) cannot be the basis for the intention of the parties on 
September 10. 1982. 
The Settlement Agreement itself shows that it deals 
with numerous other matters. The intention of the one-line 
statement pertaining to the honoring of Corbett and Gurr's 
sales at the bottom of the Settlement Agreement cannot be 
inferred from the conduct and behavior presented to the Court 
prior to a judgment four months earlier. 
After the judgment had been entered wherein Judge 
Bullock had not ordered Fitzgeralds to honor those contracts. 
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for counsel to say in the Settlement Agreement that that was 
the intent of the parties is not borne out by the record. 
Furthermore, the Record at 253:10-20 and 254:1-25 
shows that counsel for Corbett and Gurr says that the tran-
script was offered not to explain the intent of the parties in 
the Settlement Agreement, but to demonstrate that a notice of 
interest filed by Corbett and Gurr predicated the filing of 
the action at bar is in fact a lis pendens. 
The trial court in this matter indicated at Record 
256:1-18 that Exhibit No 9. the transcript of the open court 
offer from the prior trial was received to show the intent of 
the notice of interest. No testimony was given as to what was 
meant by the words "honor the previous sales." The words as 
stated from the four corners of the Agreement, and which were 
not explained by the testimony of the parties except this 
reference to the prior open court offer in the earlier trial. 
The evidence before the trial court does not meet the require-
ments of this Court's decisions holding that where there is an 
ambiguity, the Court must first find that there is an ambigu-
ity and must take evidence on that ambiguity. 
Nowhere in the Amended Findings of Fact filed by the 
trial court in this matter does the Court make any finding 
that this contract is ambiguous, nor does it make any finding 
except Findings 19 and 20 pertaining to the prior open court 
statement as a basis to determine the intent of the parties. 
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In Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, decided November, 
1988. 95 U.A.R.-ll. page 13. this Court adopted the majority 
rule from Valcarce v. Bitters. 12 Utah 2d 61. 362 P.2d 427. 
428 (1961): 
[A] condition precedent to the enforcement of 
any contract is that there must be a meeting 
of the minds of the parties, which must be 
spelled out. either expressly or impliedly, 
with sufficient definiteness to be enforced. 
The problem with the statement in the Settlement Agreement is 
that it does not indicate that if Fitzgeralds are to honor 
Corbett and Gurr's previous sales, what sales are referred to. 
nor whether or not by "honoring" they mean that if the consid-
eration paid to Corbett and Gurr on those contracts is turned 
to Fitzgeralds, then Fitzgeralds would carry out the balance 
of the terms of the contracts. 
As it was presented to the Court by reference to the 
prior open court statement. Corbett and Gurr are in the in-
equitable position of asking the Court to order Fitzgeralds to 
deliver deeds to Corbett and Gurr's buyers, with Corbett and 
Gurr retaining all of the consideration previously received on 
those contracts. 
The record is deficient in showing the intentions of 
the parties at the time of signing the Settlement Agreement. 
As stated in Buehner Block Co. v UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892 
(1988). 
there are no findings of fact respecting the 
intentions of the parties based upon extrin-
sic evidence. 
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id. at 895. 
In the case at bar there is no extrinsic evidence 
other than the inadmissible and improperly received Exhibit 9 
transcript from the prior trial from which the intentions of 
the parties could be determined as to the meaning of "honor 
Corbett and Gurr's previous sales." Absent such finding, as 
stated in Buehner. supra, the Court cannot divine the intent 
of the parties, and the unexplained intent makes the contract 
unenforceable. This position is further supported by the 
recent decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. Crowther v. 
Carter. January 4. 1989. 99 U.A.R. 29. wherein the Court said: 
But it is not the function of a court to 
rewrite an unambiguous contract. Provo City 
Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co.. 603 P.2d 803 
(Utah 1979). 
Id. at 30. 
In this case, the Court ruled on a matter without findings and 
took an issue in the Settlement Agreement without making find-
ings as to the intent of the parties and without hearing ex-
trinsic evidence, with the exception of a statement made four 
months earlier in closing argument by counsel prior to the 
ruling by Judge Bullock in the earlier decision. The court 
then wrote a condition into the Settlement Agreement and or-
dered the issuance of deeds on highly questionable contracts, 
as is more fully explained in the remainder of this brief. 
The Court should rule that it was error to hold that 
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the language in the open court offer prior to judgment to 
define the intent of the parties four months later in a Set-
tlement Agreement after judgment had been entered and the 
matter was pending on appeal. Accordingly. the contract 
should be held unenforceable. 
POINT IV 
The Trial Court Erred in Ordering Fitzgeralds 
to Deliver Deeds to James F. Pratt, Vern H. 
Bo 1 lander. Dale E. Beus. Lynn N. and Myna S. 
Murdock. James B. and Judy R. Alvey. and 
Corbett and Gurr. 
In this case, the trial court, in interpreting the 
contract to reguire Fitzgeralds to honor the sales of Corbett 
and Gurr. ordered the Fitzgeralds to convey deeds to persons 
designated by Corbett and Gurr in their testimony. The Court 
further ordered Fitzgeralds to grant a specific performance of 
the Settlement Agreement and ordered Fitzgeralds to convey to 
Corbett and Gurr 320 acres of property on payment of $11,000. 
In Barker v. Francis. 741 P.2d 548 (1987). the Court 
of Appeals acknowledged that 
It is not necessary, however, that the con-
tract itself contain all the particulars of 
the agreement. The crucial factor is that 
the parties agreed on the essential elements 
of the contract. 
Id. at 551. 
In this case, there was no testimony of what the 
essential elements of the contract were, particularly as it 
pertains to "honoring the Corbett and Gurr previous sales." 
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In the Barker case, supra, the Court held that it was 
improper for the trial court to interpret contracts to require 
a payment of a one-half interest in the ranch that was the 
subject of the litigation, because the parties were unable to 
deliver title to one-half of the ranch properties since their 
wives had not joined in the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase. The Court quoted from Herrin v. Herrin. 595 P.2d 
1152. 1155 (Mont. 1979): 
While a court may interpret contracts which 
are open to interpretation, a court may not 
make a new one for the parties and may not 
alter or amend one which the parties them-
selves have made. 
The Court then also cited Provo City Corp. v. Nielson 
Scott Co.. 603 P.2d 803. 806 (1979) on the rewriting of an 
ambiguous contract. 
In the case at bar. the contract was clearly ambigu-
ous as to what it meant in the contract to "honor all Corbett 
and Gurr's previous sales." The Court nevertheless went on to 
order specific performance. The order to convey title is 
deficient in several respects: 
A. There was no evidence that Fitzgeralds had title 
to the properties which were the subject matter of the sales 
of Corbett and Gurr. and could convey title as ordered by the 
Court. 
B. There was an ambiguity and no explanation given 
as to who was to get the funds already paid to Corbett and 
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Gurr on their previous sales, as they had done in prior con-
tracts, as testified to by Lee Fitzgerald. 
C. There was no testimony on what sales the parties 
were contemplating when they signed the Settlement Agreement. 
D. What does "honor Corbett and Gurr's previous 
sales" mean? 
In order to enter the judgment the trial court had to 
rewrite terms into that Settlement Agreement that were neither 
set forth in the Agreement itself not testified to by any of 
the parties to the action. 
In the Settlement Agreement, it was provided that 
Leland and Helen Fitzgerald agreed to give by warranty deed 
320 acres, and that warranty deeds would be given "at the time 
it is released to Leland and Helen Fitzgerald as per the 
schedule with Helen Stassi and John L. Yurka." The judgment 
entered and signed by the Court provided that upon payment of 
$11,000, the plaintiffs were ordered to convey the 320 acres 
without including the provision that "the warranty deed is to 
be given at the time the property is released to Leland A. and 
Helen Fitzgerald" in accordance to their schedule. 
In addition, the Settlement Agreement provided that 
Corbett and Gurr were to pay $11,000 in three annual install-
ments of $3,667 plus interest at 7% on the principal balance 
beginning February 1. 1983. The judgment of the Court ordered 
Fitzgeralds to convey the title to the property upon the pay-
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ment of $11,000 with no provision for the interest provided in 
the Settlement Agreement, thus rewriting the terms of the 
Settlement Agreement. 
The testimony of James Pratt is that he traded Cor-
bett and Gurr a bag of diamonds, with an appraised value of 
$60,000 but that with Corbett and Gurr he agreed to show them 
as a payment on a contract of $22,000, (Testimony of James 
Pratt, Record 301:11-25, 305:1-6). The sales contract. Exhib-
its 16 and 16a provided if the lawsuit between Corbett and 
Gurr and Fitzgeralds goes against the sellers, the seller 
would return the cash of $22,000 (Record 305:1-18). The con-
tract with James Pratt was a conditional contract pertaining 
to the initial lawsuit brought by Corbett and Gurr against the 
Fitzgeralds, which provided as a condition that if the lawsuit 
went against Corbett and Gurr, they would return his $22,000. 
In fact, the lawsuit did go against Corbett and Gurr, and on 
appeal it was affirmed, both on the first dismissal of the 
first appeal and the second appeal. Under those circum-
stances, the obligation of Corbett and Gurr was to return the 
cash of James F. Pratt. Nevertheless, the court ordered the 
Fitzgeralds to convey title to land covered by the contract. 
Under those circumstances specific performance was erroneously 
ordered by the court. 
Mr. Bolinder was not called at the trial in this 
matter, and the exhibits pertaining to the Bolinder contract 
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were presented to the court under the testimony of Boyd Cor-
bett. Exhibit No. 17 shows that a credit was given to Utah 
Ranchlands for $15,000 for drilling credit as set forth in the 
contract and that the balance of $63,000 had been paid down to 
a balance of $43,000 by the time of trial. No order was made 
that the remaining $43,000 should be paid over to the Fitzger-
alds, who were expected to honor the contract, nor was any 
order entered pertaining to the $15,000 drilling certificate 
credit or the downpayment. Under those circumstances, the 
trial court was in error in ordering a conveyance of title to 
Bolinder. No evidence was presented that Fitzgeralds had 
title to the property that was to be conveyed to Bollanders. 
Corbett and Gurr presented as evidence of an agree-
ment with Dale Beus a ledger sheet. Exhibit No. 18, which 
showed a balance of $44,850. However, counsel for Corbett and 
Gurr acknowledged that the Exhibit 18 he submitted as evidence 
of the Dale Beus contract is not a contract at all, and that 
it pertains to property in Box Elder County and not any prop-
erty which is the subject of the Settlement Agreement between 
the parties (Record 378:6-25). 
When Leland Fitzgerald was called to testify regard-
ing the Beus contract, he produced Exhibit No. 24, which coun-
sel for Corbett and Gurr later acknowledged was the only con-
tract between Corbett and Gurr and Beus. Exhibit No. 24 was 
produced when Mr. Fitzgerald asked Mr. Beus to produce his 
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contract. He came to Mr. Fitzgerald's home and produced Ex-
hibit No. 24. which is a contract signed by Boyd Corbett only 
and does not bear the signature of Dale Beus. The unrebutted 
testimony is that Mr. Fitzgerald confronted Mr. Beus and Mr. 
Corbett and said he could not understand why they would bring 
him a contract to sell 80 acres of land for $10. of which $1 
had been paid, with $9 yet to be paid. Mr. Beus said that Mr. 
Corbett said that if he gave Fitzgerald that contract. Fitz-
gerald would give him 80 acres (Record 321:16-24. 322:1-2). 
Mr. Fitzgerald went on to inquire of Mr. Beus about this 
so-called contract and asked Mr. Beus if it was a bona fide 
contract, why didn't he sign it? Mr. Beus said he did not 
want to get into any legal trouble and did not want to jeo-
pardize himself and he would not sign it (Record 322:20-23). 
Clearly the evidence presented to thecourt. unrebutted. and 
the examination of Exhibit No. 24. shows that there was no 
contract between Corbett and Gurr and Beus. and the Court's 
order ordering the conveyance of title to Mr. Beus of that 80 
acres described in that contract is error. 
With regard to the Murdock contract, the testimony of 
the Murdocks was. "I am not sure we had a contract as such, 
but Boyd owed us some money and we'd invested in another Hide-
away Ranch and he had turned it over to the Draper Bank and 
we'd paid the Bank the installments and finished paying it off 
through the bank, and we have the cancelled checks and bank 
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deposit books showing that we was paid in full" (Record 
295:9-15). This referred to the Hideaway Ranch in Juab Coun-
ty, not a contract pertaining to the Settlement Agreement as 
alleged. Mrs. Murdock was asked if they ever had a contract 
for property in Cedar Valley, to which she said she did not 
(Record 296:19-21). Mr. Murdock was asked by counsel for 
Corbett and Gurr whether or not he had a contract for purchase 
of property (Record 298:5-7): 
Q: Did you have a written contract for pur-
chase of that property? 
A: We never did have a contract. 
Thus, by the Settlement Agreement they were attempt-
ing to enforce the honoring of a contract that by the testi-
mony of the buyers was not a written contract. 
When the court a year later allowed Corbett and Gurr 
to reopen the case in a hearing on November 6, 1986, Mrs. 
Murdock was called and identified a contract (Exhibit No. 30) 
which they then said was a written contract. They had loaned 
Corbett and Gurr $25,000 (Record 416:7-10) and that they had 
been paying $40,000 on a Juab County property, the Hidden 
Valley Ranch property earlier testified to (Record 416:14-16). 
Then in order to produce a contract, they produced Exhibit 30 
and claimed it to be the contract that should be honored. 
With regard to James D. Alvey, Corbett and Gurr pro-
duced Exhibit No. 15. a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 14 
September 1977 and a record of payments. That record of pay-
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ments shows that payments had been received from and after 
September 10. 1982. the date of the Settlement Agreement, and 
counsel for Corbett and Gurr admitted that those payments had 
been received for those several years by Mr. Gurr. 
No explanation was made for the reason that if the 
Settlement Agreement was really a valid and enforceable agree-
ment, why the payments received after September 10. 1982 were 
not turned over to the Fitzgeralds instead of being pocketed 
by Mr. Gurr (Record 377:17-22 and 427:25 and 428:1-4). The 
Court inguired whether the money had been going to Mr. Fitz-
gerald, but Mr. Brown informed the Court they had not. but 
they were prepared to pay that money to Mr. Fitzgerald so that 
he would not be "out." The Court asked if it was being held 
by the bank, and Mr. Brown stated that the bank was collecting 
it and they had been giving credit to Mr. Gurr on other in-
debtedness (Record 428:9-15). 
In order for the trial court to have entered the 
order ordering the Fitzgeralds to convey deeds to these buy-
ers, the court had to write into the contract the definition 
of what sales were intended by the parties on September 10. 
1982. to include the five buyers to whom deeds were to be 
deliverd; the court had to conclude that all of the contracts 
were enforceable contracts, despite the foregoing explanations 
of the inadequacy of the contracts: and the court had to 
write into the Settlement Agreement a provision that Corbett 
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and Gurr were to retain all of the payments they had received, 
except those received after 1982 on the Alvey contract; and 
that Fitzgeralds should convey by deeds to the various parties 
without any other evidence being presented as to whether or 
not title of the specific property involved was held by Fitz-
geralds. The order of conveyances in the judgment is in error 
and should be reversed by this Court. 
POINT V 
The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Award 
Damages and Attorneys Fees to Fitzgeralds for 
Expenses Incurred as a Result of the Filing 
of the Faulted Notice of Interest by Corbett 
and Gurr. 
After Judge Bullock had entered judgment June 25, 
1982, in the original proceeding brought by Corbett and Gurr 
against Fitzgeralds (Addendum 4). Utah Ranchlands filed a 
Notice of Interest and recorded it on November 1, 1982 (Exhib-
it No. 2, Addendum No. 12). On April 18, 1984. Boyd Corbett 
filed a Notice of Interest (Exhibit No. 3, Addendum No. 17) 
(Testimony of Boyd Corbett, Record 226:23-25, 227:1-23). 
The property described in the notice of interest was 
part of the properties included in Judge Bullock's judgment 
(Exhibit No. 1, Addendum No. 4). Testimony of Boyd Corbett 
was that at the time of filing of the notice of interest he 
knew that they were included within the descriptions of the 
judgment declaring that Corbett and Gurr and Utah Ranchlands 
had no interest in those described proerties (Record 
227:24-25, 228:1-3). 
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Thereafter. Corbett and Gurr's counsel introduced 
Exhibit No. 9. which is the partial transcript pertaining to 
the open court offer of the Fitzgeralds, in order to show that 
the notice of interest was intended to be a lis pendens (Rec-
ord 253:4-20). 
The first notice of interest was recorded on November 
1, 1982, the same date that the Supreme Court dismissed the 
appeals of Corbett and Gurr in Supreme Court 18529 and 18594 
(Exhibit No. 4. Addendum 11). 
Neither in filing their initial appeals or in the 
subsequent appeals, did Corbett and Gurr ever file a motion 
for stay of execution pending appeal and or supersedeas bond. 
Under numerous established decisions of this court, the judg-
ment of Judge Bullock from the time of its entry and recording 
(Exhibit 1, Addendum 4) which judgment was recorded on June 
30, 1982, was a valid and enforceable judgment which under 
paragraph five ruled that Corbett and Gurr had no interest in 
the properties described in Exhibit A attached to the judg-
ment. Corbett admits it included the properties which were 
the subject matters of the notice of interest. 
At that point, on November 1, 1982, the parties had 
no pending litigation. 
Pursuant to the provisions of 78-40-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, a lis pendens may be filed "in any 
action affecting the title to or the right of possession of 
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real property." Plaintiff, at the time of the filing of the 
complaint or thereafter, may file a notice of the pendency of 
action. The notice of interest is not a notice of a pendency 
of action; there was no pending action; it was a final judg-
ment which became ultimately final on November 1. 1982. prior 
to the filing of the notices of interest. At that time, Cor-
bett and Gurr had no interest in the properties. 
This action was commenced originally as an action for 
slander of title and to remove the cloud on the title occa-
sioned by the notice of interest. Plaintiffs put into 
evidence Exhibits 6. 7 and 8. coupled with the testimony of 
Lee Fitzgerald as to damages he suffered as a result of being 
drawn into litigation by T.H. Bell, in part due to the filings 
of the notice of interest. The fact that that lawsuit was in 
part caused by the notice of interest is demonstrated by Exhi-
bit 8. letters from T.H. Bell, and particularly the letters 
dated February 12, 1983 and February 13. 1984. typewritten 
letters which are a part of Exhibit A in which T.H. Bell as-
serts the fact that Corbett and Gurr had filed notices cloud-
ing the title and impairing his sales. T.H. Bell had a con-
tract that originally had been entered into with Corbett and 
Gurr. When Corbett and Gurr defaulted, it was then rewritten 
as a contract between Fitzgeralds and T.H. Bell (Exhibit No. 
7). In addition to that. Fitzgeralds put into evidence the 
attorneys fees occasioned by the litigation (Exhibit No. 25). 
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In the recent decision of Bass v. Planned Management 
Services, 761 P.2d 566 (1988). this Court addressed the ele-
ments of a slander of title action, which requires a slander-
ous written or oral statement. The Court said 
A slanderous statement is one that is deroga-
tory or injurious to the legal validity of an 
owner's title or to his or her right to sell 
or hypothecate the property. 
Id. at 568. 
The testimony of Lee Fitzgerald, coupled with the 
exhibits (Record 233:4-25 and 234:1-9) demonstrate the re-
quired proof of special damages. 
The second element stated in Bass, supra, is that the 
statement must be false. At the time of the recording of the 
notice of interest. Judge Bullock had ruled that Corbett and 
Gurr and Utah Ranchlands had no interest in those properties; 
therefore, the two notices of interest filed constituted a 
false statement. 
The statement must also have been made with malice, 
and this court declined at that time to rule on the definition 
of malice, but the testimony of Boyd Corbett referred to above 
was to the effect that he knew that the court had ruled that 
he had no interest in the property; neverthless, he filed 
both notices of interest. Fitzgeralds now assert that that 
knowledgeability of the lack of interest in the property and 
the filing of the notices constitute a legal malice, meeting 
the third requirement for a slander of title. 
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Fourth, specific damages must be proven. The exhi-
bits cited above demonstrate that Mr. Fitzgerald incurred over 
$8,000 in legal expenses, plus attorneys fees, to bring the 
action to clear the title. Under those circumstances, it was 
error for the trial court to decline to award damages, even 
though the court ordered the removal of the notices of inter-
est as not being valid claims against the property and not a 
lis pendens under 78-40-2. 
The court went on to say that: 
Slander of title actions are based only on 
palpable economic injury and reguire a plain-
tiff to prove special damages... Special 
damages are ordinarily proved in a slander of 
title action by evidence of a lost sale or 
the loss of some other pecuniary advantage. 
Absent a specific monetary loss flowing from 
a slander affecting the saleability or use of 
the property, there is no damage. 
Id.- at 568. 
In this case, the unrebutted testimony and evidence 
submitted by Fitzgeralds shows that they incurred legal expen-
ses to defend the action brought against them by T.H. Bell, 
and also the attorneys fees involved in this proceeding to 
clear the title. All of that meets the requirements set forth 
in Bass, supra. 
This Court should rule that it was error to decline 
to award Fitzgeralds damages for the slander of title. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should rule that the so-called Settlement 
Agreement is unenforceable because Corbett and Gurr failed to 
meet the conditions precedent of payment of $49,000 on Septem-
ber 10. 1982. This Court should further rule that the Settle-
ment Agreement is unenforceable because of the breach of con-
tract of Corbett and Gurr in failing to drop the actions they 
had commenced against the Fitzgeralds. and their failure to 
make payment of the $11,000 in accordance with the terms of 
the Settlement Agreement. 
This Court should further rule that the issue of 
honoring Corbett and Gurr's prior sales is res judicata and 
barred by the prior rulings of the Utah Supreme Court and 
Judge Bullock's rulings. 
The Court should further rule that the Agreement was 
vague and ambiguous, and that the trial court failed to take 
evidence to establish the intent of the parties at the time as 
regards the issue of honoring of prior sales, and that without 
such findings the Agreement cannot be implemented. 
The Court should also rule that the Order of the 
trial court ordering the delivery of deeds is in error, and 
reverse the decision of the trial court. 
The Court should reverse the trial court's decision 
on the slander of title issue, and should the trial court to 
enter judgment in accordance with testimony now before it. or 
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to take further testimony on the issue of damages suffered by 
the Fitzgeralds as a result of the improperly filed notice of 
interest. 
This Court should reverse the disposition of the 
trial court. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of February, 
1989. 
^ ^ s 
M. Dayle Je 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY AND OF MAILING 
I hereby certify, that eleven copies of the foregoing 
was delivered to the Clerk of the Court. Utah Supreme Court. 
and that four copies were mailed to the below named parties by 
placing same in the United States mails, postage prepaid, this 
22nd day of February. 1989. addressed as follows: 
James R. Brown 
Jardine. Linebaugh. Brown & Dunn 
370 East South Temple. #400 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
M. Dayle Ja 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
JAMES R. BROWN (#4 56) 
JARD1NE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
Attorneys for Defendant Keith Gurr 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEE A, FITZGERALD and ) 
HELEN FITZGERALD, his wife, ) 
) JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR, ) 
and UTAH RANCHLANDS, ) Civil No. 63914 
) Judge George E. Ballif 
Defendants. ) 
The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable 
George E. Ballif, Judge, for trial on the 24th day of October, 
1985 and continued from time-to-time until the 6th day of 
November, 1986, when the matter was finally concluded by way of 
testimony and final argument. The Court having made its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and being fully 
apprised in the premises and for good cause appearing, 
therefor, it is hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs are 
entitled to have the two notices of interest which appear of 
record in the Utah County Recorder's Office to be removed. IL 
is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs are not 
entitled to any recoverable damages as the same has not been 
shown. It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants are 
entitled to specific performance of the Settlement Agreement 
dated September 10, 1982 and that upon payment of the sum of 
$11,000, Plaintiffs are hereby ordered and directed to convey 
to the Defendants 320 acres of real property, more fully 
described as follows: 
The Southwest Quarter of the Southeast 
Quarter and the West half less the Southwest 
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 
3, Township 8 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs and each 
of them are to convey to the persons and the property as 
provided below: 
a. To James F. Pratt, the Southwest Quarter of 
the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 7 South, 
Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
b. To Vern H. Bolinder, the South one-half of the 
Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter and the 
West one-half of the Northeast Quarter of Section 10, 
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Township 8 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and the Southwest Quarter and the North 
one-half of the Northwest Quarter and the Southeast 
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 3, 
Township 8 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and Parcel No. 33, Section 5, Township 8 
South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
c. To Dale E. Beus, the North half of the 
Southwest Quarter of Section 30, Township 7 South, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
d. To Lynn N. Murdock and Mina S. Murdock, his 
wife, Lots 1 and 2 of the West half of the Northwest 
Quarter of Section 30 and commencing at the center of 
Section 30, thence East 80 rods, thence North 100 
rods, thence West 160 rods, thence South 100 rods, 
thence East 180 rods, to the point of beginning, all 
in Section 30, Township 7 South, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian. 
It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants cause to 
be paid to the Plaintiffs the sum of $17,279.91 together with 
interest at the rate of 8.75% from and after September 10, 
1982, and upon receipt of said payment, Plaintiffs are to deed 
to James D. Alvey and Judy R. Alvey, his wife, and others as 
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provided in the Uniform Real Estate Contract, all of the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 28, Township 7 South, Range 2 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. Payment provided herein, 
however, is to be upon the same terms and conditions as 
contained in the September 14, 1977 contract and it is 
recognized that those payments are not all due at the present 
time and that the payments will be made at the rate of $350.92 
per month until paid in full. 
DATED this 1-7 day of dt^K^X^V^l?87 . 
BY THE COURT: 
EETMI ^EORGE- E. /B^LLIF 
Judge 
-4-
ADDENDUM NO. 2 
': •;• eci 
JAMES R. BROWN (#456) 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
Attorneys for Defendant Keith Gurr 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEE A. FITZGERALD and 
HELEN FITZGERALD, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR, 
and UTAH RANCHLANDS, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 63914 
Judge George E. Ballif 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable George E. Ballif on the 24th day of October, 1985, 
and continued from time-to-time until the 6th day of November, 
1986 when the matter was finally concluded by way of additional 
testimony and final argument. The Court having taken the 
matter under advisement and fully considered the same now 
hereby makes its: 
130 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs are husband and wife and have entered 
into certain contractual negotiations with Defendants. 
2. The Defendants agreed to purchase certain real 
property located in Utah County, which purchase agreement was 
the subject matter of prior litigation before this Court in the 
matter entitled Boyd Corbett and Keith Gurr, individuals, and 
Utah Ranchlands, a partnership, v. Lee A. Fitzgerald and Helen 
Fitzgerald, his wife, Perry G. Fitzgerald and Carolyn S. 
Fitzgerald, his wife, Civil No. 50224. 
3. The trial court, Judge J. Robert Bullock, sitting 
without a jury in Civil No. 50224, rendered a decision in May 
of 1982 affecting the parties' contractual rights and 
obligations. Judge J. Robert Bullock entered a second judgment 
dated June 25, 1982, Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 1. Defendants 
herein, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal, No. 18,529, 
in the Supreme Court of the State of Utah after Judge J. Robert 
Bullock had rendered the decision in May, 1982, but prior to 
the time that Judge J. Robert Bullock had entered a judgment, 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1, on June 25, 1982. After the entry 
of the judgment by J. Robert Bullock, Defendants herein filed 
an appeal with the Utah Supreme Court, No. 19,594. 
4. Appeals No. 18,529 and No. 19,594 were dismissed 
by order of the Utah Supreme Court on November 1, 1982. 
5. Defendants in this action purchased, under several 
Uniform Real Estate Contracts, certain properties from 
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Plaintiffs and in turn sold various parcels thereof to third 
parties who are not parties to this litigation. 
6. A major concern of all parties, both in the 
preceding litigation and this litigation, is the rights of the 
innocent purchasers who were to receive title through 
Defendants in this action from the purchase of real property 
from Plaintiffs. 
7. Defendants herein were dissatisfied with the 
decision of May 1983 and filed the notices of appeal primarily 
to have reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court the question of 
"innocent third parties" to whom they had sold certain parcels 
of the property being purchased from Plaintiffs since that 
question had not been answered by the earlier litigation. 
8. That parties, after the notices of appeal had been 
filed, negotiated and entered into an agreement which appears 
as Exhibit No. 11 entitled Settlement Agreement. 
9. The Plaintiffs acknowledged that they executed the 
document in the presence of Mr. Corbett on or around September 
10, 1982, the date it bears. 
10. Mr. Corbett testified that within 24 hours of the 
Corbett/Fitzgerald signing, Mr. Gurr signed the document. 
11. At the time of the execution of Exhibit No. 11, on 
or about September 10, 1982, there was a pending appeal before 
the Supreme Court filed by the Defendants. 
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12. After the Settlement Agreement, Exhibit No. 11, 
had been executed, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Dismiss the 
appeal on October 18, 1982, and the Defendants herein allowed 
to go unopposed said motion to dismiss the appeal, and the 
appeal was duly dismissed by the Utah Supreme Court consistent 
with the language of the Settlement Agreement, Exhibit No. 11. 
13. Subsequent to the dismissal, Plaintiffs Leland A. 
Fitzgerald, wrote two letters to the Defendants which appear as 
Exhibits 19 and 20, acknowledging the dismissal of the case 
before the Utah Supreme Court and inquiring about a list of 
purchasers on contracts referred to in the Settlement 
Agreement, Exhibit 11. 
14. The clear intent from Exhibit No. 11 and Exhibits 
19 and 20 is that Plaintiffs would honor the outstanding third 
party contracts and that any purported limiting language in 
Exhibits 19 and 20 of "honor all legitimate claims" and 
"consider honoring (Murdock) contract if it was at his 
residence within five days" would simply go to the manner in 
which performance could reasonably be expected to take place 
and that reasonable times to tender them and consider their 
authenticity would be matters based upon reasonableness under 
the circumstances rather than views of Plaintiffs as expressed 
in those letters. 
15. Subsqeuent to September 10, 1982, Plaintiffs were 
paid $49,000 on the DuPratt contract, and Defendants offered to 
-4-
make payment in to court of the three annual installments of 
$3,667 for the payment of the 320 acres. There is good and 
valuable consideration to support the agreement which appears 
as Exhibit No. 11. 
16. Some of the provisions of the contract have been 
performed to date and the court finds as fact that Defendants 
have attempted to perform the remainder of the provisions and 
have offered to make payment and stand ready, willing and able 
to perform the remaining provisions. 
17. That there are five contracts of which the 
Defendants had entered into with innocent third party 
purchasers which contracts should be honored pursuant to the 
terms and conditions of Exhibit 11 and they are as follows: 
a. James D. Alvey and Judy R. Alvey contract, 
dated September 14, 1977, appears as Exhibit 15; 
b. James E. Pratt contract, entered into on 
August 15, 1981, appears as Exhibit 16; 
c. Vern H. Bolinder contract, dated December 2, 
1977, which appears as Exhibit 17; 
d. Dale E. Beus contract, dated May 27, 1981, 
which appears as Exhibit 24; 
e. Lynn N. Murdock and Mina S. Murdock contract, 
dated December 15, 1978, which appears as Exhibit 30. 
18. Plaintiffs are entitled to any and all payments 
due or to become due from and after September 10, 1982 on any 
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of the five contracts, and upon receipt of those payments, 
Plaintiffs and each of them are to convey to the five 
purchasers from Defendants the real property as described in 
the contracts. 
19. In final argument in the original case, counsel 
for Plaintiffs urged to the court to adopt the Fitzgerald's 
position and stated to the court: 
We, Mr. and Mrs. Fitzgerald, do not want the 
persons who have bought from Corbett and 
Gurr to be hurt. And so we are suggesting 
to the court than an equitable verdict on 
termination would be if the court would 
terminate Corbett and Gurr out and enter as 
part of that termination order that Lee and 
Helen Fitzgerald honor all of the contracts 
that Corbett and Gurr have entered into with 
innocent bona fide purchasers of property 
under that contract. And they will do so 
and they are willing to do it for the 
remaining unpaid balance. If the persons 
have paid it all and not got their title, 
he'll just give them their title for 
nothing. If they've paid all but the last 
payment, he will take the last payment and 
give them their title. So that no persons 
will be hurt as a result of the terminating 
of the Corbett and Gurr contract. They will 
all be honored, if they are bona fide 
purchasers. I'm not talking about 
contractors that like the price, I'm talking 
about bona fide purchasers of land who would 
be purchasers." 
20. The foregoing quote by counsel for Plaintiff in 
the original proceeding is not an agreement made in open court, 
but is background for the interpretation of Exhibit No. 11, and 
the authenticity of the document, Exhibit 11, which is the 
compromise of the dispute between the parties while the matter 
was on appeal. 
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21. That as a result of the entering into Exhibit No. 
11 , and the refusal by Plaintiffs to honor the contracts and 
accept the payments tendered by Defendants, Defendant Corbett 
filed of record two "notices of interest" which appear as 
Exhibits No. 2 and 3. 
22. That Exhibits 2 and 3 do not constitute a valid 
lis pendens. 
23. Plaintiffs have failed to show any damages that 
have been incurred as a result of the filing by Defendant 
Corbett of the "notices of interest." 
WHEREFOREf the Court having found the foregoing 
Findings of Facts, now hereby enters its: 
CONCLDSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs are entitled to removal of the notices 
of interest. 
2. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any damages as a 
result of the recordation of said notices of interest. 
3. That the agreement between the partiesf Exhibit 
11, is a valid contract between the parties and that the 
parties on both sides are entitled to a specific performance of 
the same and that the five purchasers of the parcels delineated 
in Exhibits 15, 16, 17, 24 and 30 are entitled to have the 
property deeded to them upon payment of any and all obligations 
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that were due and owing as of September 10, 1982. That the 
James D. Alvey and Judy R. Alvey contract had a balance due as 
of September 10, 1982 of $17,279.91. That all payments 
received from and after that date should be the property of 
Plaintiffs and each of them. Upon full payment by James D. 
Alvey and Judy R. Alvey, as provided in Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs 
are to deed to the Alveys said property as described in Exhibit 
15. 
4. That the property described in Exhibit 16 to James 
F. Pratt, Exhibit 17 to Vern H. Bolinder, Exhibit 24 to Dale E. 
Beus, Exhibit 30 to Lynn N. Murdock and Mina S. Murdock, his 
wife, were all paid in full prior to September 10, 1982, and 
Plaintiffs are directed to deed to said individuals the 
property as described in the respective contracts. 
5. That Defendants and each of them are to pay to the 
Plaintiffs the sum of $11,000 in an exchange therefore and upon 
payment of the same, Plaintiffs are to deed to the Defendants 
320 acres consisting of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast 
Quarter and the West half except for the Southwest Quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter of Section 3, Township 8 South, Range 2 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
6. Defendants are entitled to their costs in this 
proceeding. 
137 
DATED t h i s X ~/ day of October, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
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ADDENDUM NO. 3 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR, 
individuals, and UTAH RANCHLANDS, 
a Partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
!'s. 
LEE A. FITZGERALD and HELEN 
1'ITZGERALD, his wife, PERRY 
(;. FITZGERALD and CAROLYN S. 
FITZGERALD, his wife, 
Defendants. 
Throughout this Memorandum Plaintiffs Corbett and 
S'urr will be referred to as P, Defendant Leland Fitzgerald 
\s D, and Third Party Defendant as PF. 
On January 31, 1977, D purchased 12,940 acres of 
and located in Cedar Valley from Richard McKinney. Under 
that contract, the land covered thereby was to be released 
':o D as follows: 
1. 24 40-acre tracts (960 acres) upon receipt of 
$75,000 down payment on or before April 1, 
1977; and, 
2. 10 40-acre tracts (400 acres) upon receipt of 
each $30,000 annual payment to be made on or 
before February 11, 1978, and ea^h year there-
after. 
One quarter section (160 acres) by the Hillside 
.Stake Farm was to be released first, and the balance to be 
released beginning on the south side working northward. 
On February 1, 1977, the following day, D entered 
:'.nto an earnest money agreement with P for the sale of a 
portion of the property covered under the McKinney contract. 
Shortly thereafter, D received two checks amounting to 
?10,000, the amount shown as earnest money. This agreement 
' .I i i. » • 
Civil No. 50224 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
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granted to P/buyer a one-year option to purchase an additional 
L0,300 acres of property covered in the McKinney contract. 
Under the terms of the earnest money agreement, P was to pay 
0 $100,000 no later than May 1, 1977 and another $100,000 
no later than July 1, 1977, at which time D was to release 
certain portions of the McKinney property to P. D testified 
Lhat on the due date of the first payment, Corbett (P) failed 
'.o appear at Draper Bank with the money and therefore that 
<>urr (P) agreed that the earnest money should be forfeited. 
However, on May 13, 1977, shortly after the due 
•late of the first $100,000 payment under the earnest money 
agreement, a contract was negotiated between D/seller and 
P/buyer for the sale of 3,140 acres of the property covered 
under the McKinney contract, which contract along with others 
incorporated most of the property covered under the earnest 
Money agreement. By the terms of the May 13 contract, P was 
i.o pay $136,000 down and $16,600 plus interest ($39,350 
.he first year) on June 1, 1978, 1979, and 1980, and $33,200 
hereafter until paid in full - the full price being $461,000. 
'Jpon the closing on June 7, 1977, P did not have $136,000 cash 
md D therefore accepted a one-month note for $62,556, 
ipparently the difference between the full down payment and 
} payment to be made on P's behalf by Curtis Young. D does 
not acknowledge receipt of the $73,400 payment and claims he 
-eceived no additional money until August 24, 1977 when P 
paid $30,000. On September 2, 1977 D claims P paid an 
ldditional $34,676.50 on the May 13 contract down payment. 
The note was renewed until January 2, 1978, but remains 
mpaid. 
The May 13 contract was ambiguous as to D's obligation 
,o release and deed property to P. The contract made apparently 
conflicting demand that D release 380 acres upon closing and 
-elease one acre for each $116.87 of principal paid. D 
-eleased 380 acres upon closing, but no further releases 
have been made. D was required to release and deed to P 
142 acres each June 1 concurrent with Pfs payment. No 
additional payments or deeds were exchanged relative to the 
Hay 13 contract. 
In August 1977, D sold to P 320 acres of the 
McKmney property which was not covered in any other contract. 
*"hese 320 acres were part of the 960 acres due D from McKinney 
»>pcm down payment. Although D delivered title to P, D received 
only a portion of the purchase price and a note for the 
balance. This note, in the amount of $3,856.90, came due on 
fanuary 2, 1978, the same day as the note on the May 13 
contract, but also remains unpaid. 
On March 6, 1978, P sold 2/3 of the May 13 contract 
property, a total of 2,240 acres, to PF. When PF became 
aware of contract disputes relative to the May 13 contract 
between P and D, he failed to make the payment to P required 
on September 6, 1978. Instead, PF made the payment to D. 
On October 6, 1978 P terminated PF's interest in the property 
"or failure to make payment. P offered to rescind the contract 
vith PF by returning the property traded to P as down payment 
but PF refused. 
During the period of time between June 7, 1977v 
'execution of the May 13 contract) and June 1, 1978 (the due 
date of the first payment under the May 13 contract) disputes 
arose between P and D. the disputes centered on the crediting 
of P for the $10,000 earnest money, P's willingness to pay 
on the notes relating to both the closing of the May contract 
and payment on the August contract, and D's ability to deliver 
-eleases to additional ground as required under the May 
contract. 
These disputes came to a head following the June 
L, 1978 due date of the first installment payment on the May 13 
contract. On that date P was to pay D $16,600 plus interest 
or a total of $39,350. In return D was obligated to release 
md deed one acre of ground for each $116.87 of principal 
-eceived, or about 142 acres. When P failed to make the 
•7i<: 
June 1, 1978 payment within the 30-day grace period, D sent 
a notice of termination to P. P claims this notice did not 
Tiect statutory requirements. A meeting ensued shortly 
thereafter on July 10, 1978 at which time P claimed to be 
teady, willing, and able to perform, but that D could not 
produce the required releases. D claimed he had the deeds 
it this meeting ready to convey, but would not give them to 
P because P wanted credit for the $10,000 earnest money. 
The escrow agent present at this meeting testified that she 
did not see the deeds and that when she later checked, no 
deeds had been recorded by D. On August 3, 1978, P wrote 
i letter to the escrow agent stating that P would pay D when 
3 could show where P had been credited for the $10,000 
2arnest money. On January 15, 1979, D filed the notice of 
termination against P, which P also claims was defective. 
o^ further payments or releases have been made under the May 
L3 contract. 
During this period of dispute under the May 13 
contract, more specifically on September 6, 1977, P and D 
2ntered into an option contract whereby P was granted an optioi 
:o purchase an additional 6,380 acres of the property covered 
jnder the McKinney contract. The option was to be exercised 
by written notice from P to D on January 15, 1978, at which 
:ime a $100,000 down payment was apparently due. Between 
the time the option contract was entered into and the time 
It was to be exercised, P, with D's knowledge, sold some of 
:he ground covered under the option to several third parties. 
Tn particular, P had arranged to trade a portion of the option 
property to McOmber for a motel. P needed releases to 400 
icres of the property covered under the McKinney contract in 
ijrder to make the trade. Under the option contract, all 
-eleases granted after execution of the option contract were 
*:o be in accordance with D's contract with McKinney. As of 
:he execution date of the option, McKinney was obligated to 
have provided D with 960 acres, most of which D had already 
f*old and deeded to P under the May 13 contract (380 acres), 
land the August contract (320 acres) i^- The evidence^indicates 
that another 160 acres of the 960 released to D, which were 
Kot covered under any contract between P and D, were sold to 
i third party. Thus, as of the execution date of the option, 
•lcKinney was not obligated to provide releases to more than 
100 acres of the property covered under the option. 
However, on February 11, 1978 upon Dfs payment of 
?30,000 to McKinney, McKinney was obligated to release another 
'4OO acres to D, and therefore to P if the option had been 
exercised. According to P, these 400 acres were to include 
h^e property which he had traded to McOmber. Prior thereto, 
In December of 1977, D had advised P that he was having 
trouble getting the releases from McKinney. As a result, 
P was unwilling to turn over the $100,000 down payment on 
t:he option to D, unless D could produce deeds to the 400 
lcres due D from McKinney on February 11, 1978. In addition, 
15
 claims D paid McKinney on January 4, 1978 in advance of the 
January 15, 1978 execution date on the option and that there-
fore D was obligated to deliver the 400 acres on the execution 
late. McKinney, in fact, did not deliver the releases in 
iccordance with his contract with D. 
Although no written notice that P intended to 
exercise the option was given to D, P claims they tendered 
performance as of the execution date by depositing with the 
escrow agent a blank check made out to D (with available 
funds sufficient to cover the check) and by instructing the 
escrow agent to issue the check if D could produce releases 
to the 400 acres. 
P now seeks specific performance of the May 
jontract and the September option, and alternatively, damages. 
D counterclaims to recover on the unpaid notes, to terminate 
dny clauns P might have to the option property, and to recover 
the balance owing on the May 13 contract or, in the alternative, 
to quiet title to the May 13 contract property in D according 
to the termination notice. 
As to P's claim against PF, P seeks to enforce 
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paragraph 16A of the Uniform Real Estate Contract^which 
Releases him from any obligation to convey propertyJTand 
allows P to retain all payments as liquidated damages. PF 
ceeks to recover the difference between the value of the 
property he gave and the value of the property he received. 
In the event the May 13 contract is enforced, PF seeks judg-
ment for the difference between the rescission amount, as 
(escribed above, and the amount owing to P upon reinstatement 
<>f the March contract. 
All parties seek to recover attorney fees. 
EARNEST MONEY AND OFFER TO PURCHASE 
The Court is of the opinion that the earnest money 
igreement was replaced by several subsequent contracts by 
tacit, if not expressf agreement of the parties. There is some 
question, therefore, as to whether or not either party has 
'.hown by a preponderance of the evidence a meeting of the 
Minds with respect to the $10,000 earnest money essential 
» o a finding by the Court of an enforceable contract with 
•espect thereto. However, the Court believes that the evidence 
loes preponderate in favor of the proposition that D gave P 
*redit for the $10,000 by reducing the purchase price of the 
and under the May 13 contract from $471,000 to $461,000, 
ind therefore, the issue is moot. 
MAY 13 CONTRACT 
The language of paragraph 20 of the May 13 contract 
s ambiguous as to the obligations of each party at the time 
)f execution. By the terms thereof seller is to release and 
«lced to buyer "one (1) acre for each $116.87 principal, 
-eduction paid hereunder." The contract further states that 
'concurrent with the execution of this agreement Seller 
,hall release and deed to Buyer title to the following 
Jescribed land:", which included 380 acres of specific property. 
The ambiguity lies in the amount of property D is required 
-o release and deed to P upon payment of the $136,000 down 
payment If the "one-acre-for-each-$116.87-principal-reduction" 
:lause operates independent of the "concurrent-with-execution" 
73CJ 
737 
clause, and principal is construed to mean the full purchase 
price of $461,000 rather than the balance of $325,000, then 
upon execution D would be required to release *nd deed to P 
:.n excess of 1163 acres. If the "one-acre-for-each-$116.87-
principal-reduction" clause applies only to the balance of 
!:he $325,000, then D would only be required upon execution 
«:o release and deed 380 acres as described. 
The evidence preponderates toward the latter view 
:or the following reasons: 
1. Under the first interpretation, D would have 
had to release and deed to P upon execution more ground than 
1' would have paid for. The purchase price of the ground was 
!U50 per acre. At that rate P would have paid for about 
<)07 acres but would have received releases and deeds to at 
.east 1163 acres upon execution of the contract. 
2. There is no evidence that upon closing P 
demanded more than 380 acres or made any arangements for the 
-elease of more ground prior to the initial payment. 
3. The term "principal" generally applies to an 
amount financed against which interest is charged. D financed 
'5325,000 not $461,000. 
4. Under the first interpretation, all deeds 
would have been transferred when less than 807* of the purchase 
price had been paid. However, under the latter interpretation, 
:he last of the property would have been transferred concurrent 
with the final payment. 
Based on the foregoing interpretation of the contract, 
;he Court finds that neither party was in breach prior to 
June 1, 1978, the date the first installment payment became 
• lue, D had performed his duty to that point by deeding 380 
acres' to P. P's counterperformance was the payment of $136,000. 
Although D signed the May 13 contract which acknowledged 
'receipt of $136,000, the money was not received, and the 
evidence indicates that neither party expected to receive 
It until some unspecified time after closing. Apparently, 
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$73,400 of the down payment was to be paid by Curtis Young 
im P's behalf. The balance of the $136,000 was given by P 
l:o D in the form of a promissory note in the amount of 
!?62,556 ($73,400 + $62,556 = $135,956). 
Although the evidence shows 1) that D has never 
been paid on the note, the renewal of which came due on 
January 2, 1978, and 2) that Curtis Young and others have 
not paid more than $64,676.50 of the alleged $73,400, the 
•Jourt believes D acquiesced to P's method of making the down 
bayment. There is no evidence that D demanded P's 
Performance prior to June 1, 1978. And, neither of D's 
rermination notices referred to delinquency on the down 
bayment. D's first notice to P dated June 29, 1978 states, 
'If all payments due under this contract are not paid in full 
immediately, this contract will be rescinded..." Unfortunately, 
Lt does not state what payments D considered due. However, 
It is dated the day before the expiration of the 30-day grace 
period relative to the June 1, 1978 payment. The next notice 
dated July 31, 1978 referenced only the "Payment due June 1, 
L978," although no further payments had been made between the 
dates of the two notices. 
The critical issue relative to the May 13 contract 
Is whether or not either party placed the other in breach 
':>y tendering performance required as of the June 1, 1978 
installment payment. It is clear to the Court that D was 
obligated to release and deed 142 acres to P upon each June 
1 payment of $16,600 plus interest starting in 1978, and 
continuing until 1981 when the acreage and the payment were 
to double. In the Court's view of the law, obligations 
to pay and obligations to release and deed property which 
become simultaneously due are generally considered conditions 
concurrent. Specifically, it is the Court's opinion that 
D's duty to release and deed property to P did not arise 
until P came forth with the payment and, conversely, P's 
duty to make the payment did not arise until D came forth 
with the releases and deeds. 
According to Williston, 
"It is one of the consequences of concurrent 
conditions that a situation may arise where 
no right of action ever arises against either 
party. Since a conditional tender is necessary 
to put either party in default, so long as both 
parties remain inactive, neither is liable and 
neither has acquired a right of action. More-
over, the possibility of putting either party 
in default will cease if the delay is too long. 
It may be supposed by the terms of the contract 
the concurrent performances were to be rendered 
on a day fixed, or it may be supposed that no 
time was stated for performance. Under the 
first supposition (which is the case here) if 
time was of the essence of the contract both 
parties will be discharged unless one or the 
other takes the initiative and makes a condi-
tional tender at or about the time stated in 
the contract." 
Williston on Contracts, Section 832, Sufficiency of Readi-
ness and Willingness to Perform, pp. 96-100. 
The situation described by Williston fits the facts 
3f this case. D failed at any time to tender performance of 
lis obligation to "release and deed" property to P upon the 
June 1, 1978 payment. D's alleged tender at the July 10, 
1978 meeting was insufficient because D did not have the 
•\bility to perform at that time. The escrow agent's testimony 
.vas that no deeds had been recorded from McKinney to D upon 
search following the July meeting. D did not allege nor did 
the evidence show any other attempt on the part of D to tender 
his performance. 
P also failed to tender performance of the June 1, 
1978 payment. Assuming P had the present ability to perform 
and that D had waived any objection to the method of payment, 
P's alleged tender at the July 10, 1978 meeting failed because 
Lt was contingent upon performance to which P was not entitled. 
"A tender, to be good, must be free from any condition which 
the tenderer does not have a right to insist upon." Sieverts 
v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P.2d 974. Apparently P's tender 
was contingent upon two conditions, neither of which P was 
entitled to. The conditions were 1) credit for the $10,000 
earnest money and 2) release of deeds for payment of the down 
payment according toithe ' Vm
 e-acre-for-each-$U6>,87r of£) 
principal-paid^'"clause^ (See discussion 'piOftej^cggE&sBg 
bretation of the May 13 contract, above) The, escrow agent;, 
restified that, based on her recollection of the July 10, 
L978 meeting, "(T)here was some dispute over the $10,000 
ind some dispute as to whether or not Lee actually had 
o get some of the land released from McKinney or not.n 
»'s letter of July 21, 1978 substantiates and clarifies P's 
:onditions. In the letter P states that $73,400 was paid down 
'md that $16,600 of principal was tendered and therefore 
le was entitled to release of 770 acres ($73,400 + $16,600/ 
$116.87 = 770), less the 380 acres received with the down 
iciyment, or 390 acres. Under our interpretation of the 
contract, D's counterperformance relative to any of the down 
payment (the alleged payment of $73,400) was satisfied upon 
receipt of the initial 380 acres. P therefore had a right to 
:>nly 142 acres upon the June 1, 1978 payment and not 390 
acres as he requested. 
The parties clearly agreed that time was of the 
essence. (See paragraph 16 of the contract) Neither party 
endered performance at the specified time. The first 
llleged tender did not occur until 40 days after the due 
late of the June payment and 10 days after the expiration 
of the grace period. At that time D could not produce the 
required deeds and P was asking for ground and earnest money 
credit to which he was not entitled. No further tender was 
-nade of the performance required by either party on June 1, 
1978 
Where neither party performed, or tendered performance 
in a timely manner, and time was of the essence, it is the 
opinion of the Court that both parties were discharged of 
their duties under the contract, and the parties should be 
left where they are found unless the Court in equity should 
decide that such would amount to an unjust enrichment of 
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one of the parties. "Under some circumstances a quasi 
contract arises independent of the intention of the parties 
where a special contract has been partly performed and such 
quasi contract is founded upon the doctrine of unjust enrich-
ment. The basis of liability under a quasi contract resulting 
."rom a part performance of a special contract is the benefit 
conferred upon a defendant by the part performance of a 
special contract, and not the detriment incurred by the 
plaintiff." 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Restitution and Implied Contracts, 
Section 12. Partial or defective performance of contract, 
•). 954. 
Williston adds, 
"Indeed, wherever justice requires compensation 
to be given for property or services rendered 
under a contract, and no remedy is available by 
an action on the contract, restitution of the 
value of what has been given must be allowed." 
Williston on Contracts, Section 1479, Rescission 6c Resti-
tution, No Liability in Contract, at pp. 271-272. Also, 
Williston clearly sets forth the elements of a claim for 
.injust enrichment: 
"1. A benefit conferred upon the defendant by 
the plaintiff; 
2. An appreciation or knowledge by the defen-
dant of the benefit; and 
3. The acceptance or retention by the defendant 
of the benefit under such circumstances as to 
make it inequitable for the defendant to retain 
the benefit without payment of its value." 
Id., at 276. 
These elements are present in this case. The 
evidence shows that D has received a benefit, with knowledge 
and appreciation of such benefit, which is disproportionate 
to the value of what he gave up so as to make its retention 
inequitable. To date, D has received the following benefit 
under the May 13 contract: 
earnest money $10,000.00 
check (Exhibit 25) 30,000.00 
check (Exhibit 26) 34,483.13 
check (Exhibit 28) 193.37 
title policy 1,387.50 
escrow fee 75 00 
recording fee 12,50 
$76,151.50 
In return, D has given P title to 380 acres, 
valued at $150 per acre at the time of contract or $57,000; 
and, the use of $62,556 until the contract failed, valued at 
$7,670 81. Adding these values shows a total value given 
}y D of $64,670.81 
The difference between the value D gave ($64,670.81) 
ind the value he received ($76,151.50) is $11,480.69. The 
Court concludes that D has been unjustly enriched by this 
amount and, therefore, grants judgment in favor of P for 
$11,480 69 
In order to avoid adding to Dfs unjust enrichment, 
the Court denies D's prayer for judgment on the delinquent 
$62,556 promissory note signed by P as part of the down pay-
ment on the May 13 contract. 
Also, as part of this decision, the Court 
acknowledges D's offer in open court to honor the contracts 
covering the May 13 contract property made between P and 
all "innocent and bona fide purchasers prior to trial 
regardless of the amount paid to P," and expects D to perform 
according to this offer. 
THE SEPTEMBER OPTION 
The Court denies Pfs request for specific performance 
of the September option because the option was not exercised 
according to its terms and P failed to tender performance 
as of the execution date, January 15, 1978. It is elementary 
contract law that an offeror may choose the method of accep-
tance, and such method must be followed unless waived by the 
offeror More specifically, "This court has long adhered to 
the rule that an option must be exercised in accordance with 
its terms." Nance v. Schoonover, 521 P.2d 896, Equitable 
Realty, Inc. v Nielsen, 519 P.2d 423, 30 U.2d 433 The 
contract clearly states that the option is to be exercised 
by written notice to D on or before January 15, 1978. There 
is no evidence that P gave the required written notice 
Although P claims that D actually participated in several 
of P's contract sales of the option property prior to the 
Execution date and that D, even after execution date, 
'ndicated that he would work things out, the Court finds 
Lhat the evidence is insufficient to sustain a waiver under 
either contention. 
The Court also concludes that by the terms of the 
September option P was obligated to tender $100,000 to 
Bxercise the option, but D was not concurrently obligated 
to tender releases to 400 acres as P demanded. Under the 
terms of the September option it is not entirely clear that 
2ither the $100,000 down payment or releases according to the 
McKinney contract were required on the execution date. 
However, the evidence indicated that the parties thought the 
$100,000 was due at that time, and such is the most reasonable 
interpretation of the option language. But, the option did 
not create a concurrent condition that D release and deed 
400 acres of ground to P as P alleges. The contract clearly 
states that "releases granted after execution of contract 
shall be in accordance: with the McKinney contract. As of 
the execution date on the September option, D could not have 
been obligated to deliver more than 100 acres. At that time, 
McKinney was obligated to have provided 960 acres to D. 
Although D had received title to this property, most of it 
had already been deeded to P under other contracts; 380 acres 
upon closing of the May 13 contract and 320 acres upon closing 
of the August sale. D also sold 160 acres of the McKinney 
property, not covered in any contract between P and D, to a 
third party. Therefore, at most, D could have delivered 
title to 100 acres upon execution of the option, January 15, 
1978. 
P claims the option agreement created concurrent 
conditions, that D was obligated to produce 400 acres upon 
payment of $100,000 down, and therefore that a conditional 
tender was sufficient to place D in breach. It is P's 
Contention that these obligations became concurrent because 
j) made his $30,000 payment to McKinney on January 4, 1978 
rather than February 11, 1978 when it became due. Therefore, 
P was entitled to the 400 acres to which D became entitled 
upon payment. This argument is unconvincing because at the 
rime the option was entered (September 7, 1977), P could not 
have predicted or required D's early payment. Therefore, 
the parties upon entrance of the contract clearly did not 
contemplate concurrent conditions, and the law should not 
Imply such against the intent of the parties at the time the 
:ontract was entered into. 
Even if a conditional tender were sufficient to 
nlace D in breach, P's alleged tender did not satisfy legal 
requirements. For a conditional tender to operate it must 
be communicated to the other party. See 74 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Section 1, Tender. "Tender implies the physical act of 
offering the money or the thing to be tendered, but this cannot 
-est in implication alone." Id., Section 7, Production 
.ind Offer. The escrow agent's testimony was that she did 
not tender the blank check to D. Absent evidence that P 
rendered it, no tender was made. Also, a blank check in the 
instant case was probably insufficient tender. Although 
i check is good tender when not objected to (Sieverts v. 
White, 273 P.2d 974, 2 U.2d 351), the opportunity to object 
-nust be afforded the creditor. "There is no waiver where the 
creditor is not present to object." 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Tender, 
Section 10, p. 553. Because no meeting took place on the 
Execution date, D was not present when the check was deposited, 
Ind the presence of the check was not communicated to D prior 
to the execution date, D could not have waived his right to 
Cull tender. 
THE MARCH CONTRACT 
The Court finds that the March contract created 
the following obligations: 
1. Upon execution of the March contract, P was 
obligated to deed 60 acres to PF in partial payment for the 
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exchange property deeded from PF to P at that time, valued 
at $252,000. Also, in return for; the exchange property 
V was obligated to deed an additional 640 acres to PF, 60 
acres "at such time as Seller is able to obtain releases 
from RLC Investment, Inc." and 580 acres "to be released 
to Buyer at such time as Seller obtains release of said 
acreage from Leland A Fitzgerald" in accordance with the 
May contract. 
2 Six months after execution of the contract, 
specifically on September 6, 1978, PF was obligated to pay 
S23,238 75 plus interest, and to continue to pay that amount 
<Mch March 6th and September 6th until paid in full. In 
ieturn P was to release and deed one acre for each $368 
principal reduction paid, or about 63 acres upon each pay-
nent These obligations created concurrent conditions; that 
s, P's duty to deliver 63 acres upon each payment did not 
irise until PF came forth with the payment and, conversely, 
T's duty to make each installment payment did not arise 
mtil P came forth with the deeds. 
Under this interpretation of the contract, the 
'Jourt concludes, as it has with respect to the May 13 
ontract, that neither party made a conditional tender of 
oerformance required on September 6, 1978 sufficient to place 
.he other party in breach, and therefore, neither party has 
I cause of action against the other. PF never claimed to 
have tendered performance Rather, PF claimed that he did 
not have to pay P the September payment, and therefore, paid 
Lt to Lee Fitzgerald because of P's prospective inability to 
jeliver the required deeds PF was aware of the dispute 
between P and D on the May 13 contract and that P would be 
Jnable to perform on the March contract unless those disputes 
</ere resolved Utah law is clear that if the vendor has 
'so lost or encumbered his title that he will not be able 
to fulfill his contract, he cannot insist that the purchaser 
c^ontinue to make payments where it is obvious that his own 
performance will not be forthcoming." Marlowe Investment 
Corporation v. Radmall, 485 P.2d 1402, 26 Utah 2d 124. And, 
a "buyer should not be heard to complain unless it appears 
I hat it will be impossible or at least highly unlikely that 
the seller will be unable to perform his contract when he 
s called upon to do so." Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 513 
fJ.2d 417, 30 Utah 2d 47. In that case, the fact that the 
seller had sold to a third party some of the land previously 
sold, but not yet deeded, to plaintiff/buyer was not suf-
ficient to show that the seller would be unable to perform 
when his obligation arose. 
The key factual issue here is whether or not P's 
performance was impossible or sufficiently unlikely to excuse 
0 from his obligation to pay P, or at least make a conditional 
render. If the sale of land to a third party was insufficient 
:o show impossibility or sufficient unlikeliness, a fortiori, 
:ontract disputes which were yet unresolved would also be 
Insufficient. 
PF also claimed that P breached his covenant, 
under paragraph 11, that he would not "default in the payment 
of his obligations against said property." This contention 
falls short because P's performance which was concurrent with 
D's obligation to provide certain deeds, never was called 
for by D tendering those deeds. (See discussion of the 
May 13 contract.) 
PF also claimed that under paragraph 18 of the 
contract, he had the right to pay D directly and receive 
credit for such payment. But, paragraph 18 does not apply 
because it specifically excludes the right to make payment 
relative to liens or encumbrances "herein provided for or 
referred to," and the $325,000 owed to D is obviously 
referred to in the contract. 
As to P's performance, P never claimed to have 
tendered the deeds required concurrent with the September 6, 
1978 payment, and tfiare ia 110 evidence that P ever did tender 
those deeds. Therefore, neither party placed tfcre other in 
breach by tendering performance in a timely manner or other 
wise, and the Court must leave the parties where it finds 
them, unless such would amount to an unjust enrichment of 
the other. 
PF, at the time the contract was entered into, 
deeded property to P valued by the parties at $252,000. In 
return PF has received 60 acres valued at the time of contract 
at $320 per acre, or $19,200. Given the disparity between 
the value of what P has received and the value of what P has 
paid, the Court concludes that P has been unjustly enriched 
and that leaving the parties where they are found would be 
tantamount to enforcement of an otherwise unenforceable 
forfeiture provision. See Kay v. Woods, 549 P.2d 709; 
Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446, 121 Utah 468; Jacobson v. 
Swan, 278 P.2d 274, 2 U.2d 59. 
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the Court 
concludes the following as to the March contract: 
1. P's prayer for enforcement of paragraph 16(a) 
of the Uniform Real Estate Contract which would release P 
from its obligations to convey the property and allow P 
to retain all payments as liquidated damages, and any other 
relief requested, including attorneys fees, is denied. 
2. EMs prayer for judgment for the difference 
in the value of the property he delivered to P and the 
value of the 60 acres he received, and attorneys fees, is 
also denied. 
3. In order not to unjustly enrich P when P was 
unable to perform, P is ordered to return to PF the property 
received without any encumbrances and in the same condition 
as when it was received In return, ID is ordered to pay P 
the contract price of $320 per acre for the 60 acres received, 
or $19,200. 
AUGUST SALE 
Pursuant to agreement of the parties, the Court 
finds with respect to the August sale as follows: 
1. P signed a note in favor of D, 7Sf 
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iee Fitzgerald, in partial payment for property received; 
chd 
2. Said Note in the amount of $3,856.90 has been 
c'elinquent since January 2, 1978, 
From the foregoing findings the Court grants 
I 's request for judgment on the note in the amount 
< £ $6,170.73 and reasonable attorneys fees in the sum of 
'•600. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The following principles apply to the resolution 
rf the various requests for attorney fees: 
1. "Attorney's fees cannot be recovered unless 
i rovided for by statute or by contract." B & R Supply Co. 
v. Bringhurst, 503 P.2d 1216, 28 U.2d 442. 
2. "The rule that judgment must be based on 
findings of fact, which in turn must be based on evidence, 
is applicable to awarding attorney fees." F.M.A. Financial 
Corp. v. Build, Inc., 404 P.2d 670, 17 U.2d 80. 
3. "Since both judges and lawyers have special 
Inowledge as to the value of legal services, such services 
•re not always required to be proven by sworn testimony, and 
they are sometimes submitted upon stipulation as to the amount, 
'•r the judge may fix the amount on the basis of his own know-
ledge and experience, and/or in connection with reference 
to a bar approved schedule." Id. 
4. "Attorney's fees may not be awarded where there 
is nothing in the record to sustain the award either by way 
fif evidence of by stipulation of the parties as to how the 
Court may fix it." Butler v. Butler, 461 P.2d 727, 23 U.2d 
. 59. 
5. "It is appropriate to apply basic principles 
of contract law, namely, the creation of a contract requires 
i meeting of the minds of the parties; and the burden of so 
proving is upon the party who claims there was a contract," 
.Spanish Fork Packing Co. v. House of Fine Meats, Inc, , 508 
I".2d 1186, 29 U.2d 312. 
Applying these principles to the contracts before 
the Court, the Court concludes as to each contractus 'follows:" 
1. May 13 Contract 
Under the theory that attorney fees are 
recoverable only if provided for by contract or statute, and 
lhat basic contract principles apply as to whether or not 
I.here is a contract, neither party is entitled to recover 
lttomey fees. Neither party performed, the contract expired, 
and its terms became unenforceable. Even if the contract were 
enforceable, neither party placed the other in breach so as 
*:o trigger the enforcement of the clause covering attorney 
Tees. 
2. September Option 
The contract provision providing for recovery 
of attorney fees expired when the option was not timely 
exercised and when P failed to tender performance. Again, 
:here is no contract or statute under which attorney fees 
;an be awarded. 
3. March Contract 
The analysis is identical to that under the 
'lay Contract. 
4. August Sale 
Reasonable attorney fees, in the amount of 
$600, are recoverable by D under the terms of the delinquent 
tote. 
Counsel for defendant Lee Fitzgerald is directed 
to prepare and submit to the Court for signature within 15 
days under Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice appropriate 
judgments and orders necessary to implement this decree, 
axcept as it affects the March contract between Perry 
Fitzgerald and Corbett and Gurr. As to the latter contract, 
counsel for Perry Fitzgerald will prepare said judgments 
and orders. 
Dated this 4 ~ ^ day of Ap*#t, 1982. 
BY THE COURT: 
:C: Byron L, Stubbs, Esq. 
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq. 
Robert B. Hansen, Esq. 
if JUDGE 
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M. DAYbE JEFFS OF JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys for Defendants^Fitzgerald 
90 North 100 East 
P. 0. Box 683 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: 373-8848 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR, 
individuals, and UTAH RANCH-
LANDS, a partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
LEE A. FITZGERALD and HELEN 
FITZGERALD, his wife, PERRY 
G. FITZGERALD and CAROLYN S. 
FITZGERALD, his wife, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No, 50224 
/ 
This matter came on duly and reguarly to be heard 
before the above entitled Court, Judge J, Robert Bullock 
sitting without a jury on the 9th and 10th day of February, 
1982 upon the Complaint of the plaintiffs, the Counterclaim of 
the defendants, Lee A, Fitzgerald and Helen Fitzgerald, and 
the Counterclaim of the defendants, Perry G. Fitzgerald and 
Carolyn S. Fitzgerald. The issues of the plaintiffs and all 
other parties is reserved for further trial. The Court having 
heard the evidence, both oral and documentary, having heard 
the arguments of counsel, having been fully advised in the 
premises, and having taken the matter under advisement, and 
based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law hereto-
fore entered, now makes and enters the following: 
S! 
Hi 
CO 
JUDGMENT 
1. Plaintiffs are granted judgment against the 
defendants, Lee A, Fitzgerald and Helen Fitzgerald, in the 
amount of $4,709.96. 
2. It is the judgment of the Court that plain-
tifts and defendants, Lee A. and Helen Fitzgerald, are dis-
charged of any obligations under the May 13, 1977 Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. Said contract is held to be of no further 
force or effect. 
3. It is the judgment of the Court that the 
Earnest Money Agreement and Option to Purchase dated February 
1, 1977 expired for non-payment and by mutual agreement of the 
parties. 
4. Plaintiffs are adjudged to be entitled to 
retain the 380 acres heretofore conveyed to plaintiffs by Lee 
A. and Helen Fitzgerald under the May 13, 1977 Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. 
5. The Court rules that plaintiffs have no 
interest in the remaining properties described in the May 13, 
1977 contract and more particularly described in Exhibit MAM 
attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof. 
6. The Court rules tnat the plaintiffs have no 
interest in and to the properties described in the September 
7, 1977 option more particularly described on Exhibit MBW 
attached hereto. 
7. Except for the $600.00 attorney's fees 
^warded defendants, Lee A. and Helen S. Fitzgerald, and in-
cluded in the computations of paragraph 1 above, each party 
shall bear their own costs and attorney's fees. 
-2-
8, All other claims encompassed in the plead-
ings of this action between plaintiffs, Boyd Corbett and Keith 
Gurr, and defendants, Lee A. Fitzgerald and Helen S. 
Fitzgerald, are dismissed with prejudice, rv 
Dated and signed this^<^ day ofyfery> 1982. 
BY T, 
Robert Bullock, Ju 
CC/OMY OF UfAH ) , / * /^ffiaS 
i, THE UNOfKSJGM£D^C_ _ 
OF UTAH COUNTY, OTAtfjetfl; 
ANNCXED AND P0REGG4N9 IS K^  J[tW_,_„ „ ™ - „ . . 
AH ORIGINAL DOCUME^OH WMm^pff^f^^OjA 
WITNESS MY HAND<aDj^^C* .SA1^COl^r i TtfW 
3Q DAY OF ^„fr^<&rs^;± f <*^F 
WIUlAMiv^UISH, 
EXHIBIT MA" 
The Northwest Quarter of Section 31, Township 7 
South, Range 1 West, of the Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and the East half of the Southwest 
Quarter of Section 30, Township 7 South, Range 1 West 
of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian. Also: 
Commencing at the center of Section 30, Township 7 
South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
thence East 80 rods; thence North 100 rods? thence 
West 160 rods; thence South 100 rods; thence East 80 
rods to beginning. 
The Northwest Quarter, the Wesc half of the Northeast 
Quarter, Lots 3, 4, all of Section 19, Township 7 
South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
The North half of the Northwest Quarter, the West 
half of the Northeast Quarter, the Southeast Quarter 
and the South half of the Southwest Quarter, all of 
Section 18, Township 7 Soutn, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
The Northeast Quarter, the Southeast Quarter, the 
South half of the Southwest Quarter, the Northwest 
Quarter, all of Section 7, Township 7 South, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
The Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter, the 
North half of the Northwest Quarter, the Southwest 
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter, the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter all of Section 6, 
Township 7 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
The East half of Section 28, Township 7 South, Range 
2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
The East half of Section 2, Township 8 South, Range 2 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
The North half of the Northwest Quarter, the North 
half of the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter, all of Section 1, Township 8 South, Range 2 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
The Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of 
Section 36, Township 7 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
-4-
EXHIBIT "B 
All of Section 22, Township 7 South, Range 2 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
All of Section 23, Township 7 South, Range 2 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
All of Section 27, Township 7 South, Range 2 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
All of Section 26, Township 7 South, Range 2 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
All of Section 34, Township 7 South, Range 2 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
All of Section 35, Township 7 South, Range 2 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
All of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
The East half of Section 33, Township 7 South, Range 
2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
The East half and the Southwest Quarter of Section 
21, Township 7 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian. 
The Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of 
Section 36, Township 7 South, Range 2 West. 
All of Section 3, Township 8 South, Range 2 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, excepting therefrom the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said 
section. 
The North half of Section 25, Township 7 South, Range 
2 West, Salt Lake base and Meridian. 
The East half and the Southwest Quarter of Section 
21, Township 7 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian. 
The West half of Section 24, Township 7 South, Range 
2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
The East half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 28, 
Township 7 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
The South half of the Southeast Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter and the West half of the Northeast 
Quarter of Section 10, Township 8 South, Range 2 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
1 
2 II The East half of the Northwest Quarter and the 
Southwest Quauter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 
3 II 12/ Township 8 South/ Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian. 
4 
Excepting therefrom any and all oil/ gas and mineral 
5 || rights. 
§ I Excepting therefrom any and all grazing rights until 
property is fenced. 
7 " 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
3i 
32 
rFS 
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ADDENDUM NO. 5 
[CUSTOMER S ORDER NO 
1 
[NAME 
AOORESS 
s^ 
1 DEP^ 
1 \ 1 5 ^ -
I DATE | 
1 i 
A * H ] C O O J C M A » & C ] ON ACCT I M O U M TO f A i o O U T 
^QUAN, & V > K ^ 
J<JLcS,r<.r^p ^ 7 
/ - • T 2 y ^ ^ 
^ 
5*s> f ^ 
* ^70^ ?l J^.^ji 
V e ^ V ^ L ^ ) . ^ ., • %&/*- -70 
10 C-vf?*^- / ^ y - T ^ 
11 /. f j 
12 /7^- ^ 13 
14 
^-y ? re '• 7-
15 
,16 
"^J? G*4£z_ 117 
'18 
REC'O 8Y 
R«difprm 
5H330 
KEEP THIS SLIP 
FOR REFERENCE 
ADDENDUM NO. 6 
2DEFENDANFS1 
EXHIBIT 
NO. /3 
T<ELE AS E OF JUDG.VENT 
For the sum of $4,709.96 herein paid in full on this 28th 
day of September, 198 2, We, Boyd Corbett and Keith Gurr, acting 
as individuals, and doing business as Utah Ranchlands, release 
the $4,70°.96 judgment against Helen S. and Lee A, Fitzgerald, 
in favor of Boyd Corbett and Keith Gurr and Utah Ranchlands, 
entered on June 29, 1982 in the Fourth District Court in and 
for Utah County, Utah, Case No. 50,224 
Utah Ranchlands 
r 0 ^-
£>yo( Boyd Co/ ett, as an individual 
.for Utah-Ranchlands 
Kpzta Gurtrir'-al5 an individual 
for Utah Ranchlands 
State of Utah 
County of Salt Lake SS. 
On this 28th day of Sept. 1982 personally apoeared before r?.e 
Boyd Corbett and Keith Gurr, the signers of the vi4; v_n :.rstrur.e**J" 
who du.lv acknowledged to v?.s that they executed, the c?.Te. 
Notary Pub l i c a t D^aper^ Ut^h 
My Comm. e x p i r e s S^/ >~~v& 
ADDENDUM NO. 7 
FENDANrS 
rEXHIBITi 
SETTfIEMENFT AGRCEMFNT 
We, G. Boyd Corbett and Keith L. Gurr, doing business as 
Utah Ranchlands, hereby agree to settle all legal actions, 
lawsuits, appeals to the Supreme Court, etc., concerning Leland 
A, and Helen S. Fitzgerald and all their Cedar Valley property. 
In consideration for settlement, We, Leland A. and Helen S. 
Fitzgerald agree to give by Warranty Deed 320^a£res; located in 
The SW\s of the SE1* and the W*j except for the SW!* of the NW^ all 
in Section 3, T 8 S, R 2 W, SLBM. Warranty deed will be given at 
the time it is released to Leland A. and Helen S. Fitzgerald, as 
per schedule with Helen Stassi and Johnel1 Yurka. 
We, G. Boyd Corbett and Keith L. Gurr, agree to pay Leland 
A. and Helen S. Fitzgerald, $11,000.00 in three annual installments 
of $3,667.00 plus interest at 7 % on principle balance owing 
beginning Feb. 1, 1983 and annually thereafter until principle 
with interest is paid in full. 
This agreement subject to payment in excess of $49,000.00 
on the DuPratt contract on this 10th day of September, 1982. 
t //.ft 
Fitzgerald's agree to honor all Corbett and Gurr's previous sales ^ - ^ 
Dated this 10th day of September, 1982. ^fM^'e^f #Jjx 
Utah RanchJands by 
G. Boyd Corbett 
as a partner and as an individual 
^Uu^Ar^' 
Keith L. Gurr 
as a partner and as an individual 
" —^ yy* 
land A. Fitzgerald 
an individual 
n/ //' ^ ~-
I l l I I >K N i l II II II Il III Ill 
// s 
File # 1+579 
I! IJ ''I IS? 
Leland A- Fitzgerald 
Helen S. Fitzgerald 
$1*9,Vxl /?. - Annual Payment from Utah Ranchlands 
L» . w > .- • o 
110.23 
139.91 
Less Payment to Utah Couri ty Treasure r 
t ! ?! It If It ft 
B-1508-A 
B-1533-A 
$U8,720.79 TOTAL 
CUSTOMER'S RECEIPT ONLY 
DRAPE n&aiJ 
D . B . & T. ) CT T R U S T 
Keith Chirr 
E
 LEE FITZGERALD 
m 
D A T E
 «>«(»!,, !'/i „!" (• I 
v ; mi ii in11 
" i " i i i 
4/ I.I 
hd,m.y**— 
CASHIER'S CMB'.K 
M l , ( . , • M l t * . DOL I ARS 
" MQRANDUM Dl IL i 
)T NEGOTIABLE 
** 
Nome; & Address 
r
 LELAND A. FITZGERALD 
208 FAST 13800 SOUTH 
DRAPER, UTAH 84020 
Cod* No. • j No.; ^ M o . .. j Day L Vr. 
146. 01 ! 10 '06 ' 82 _; ; 0030406 I 
RECEIVED FROM: C H K * 
VAI ,LEY TITLE COMPANY TRUST ACCOUNT Rxl 
CASH 
I } 
J 
% ^ v | i ^ DESCRIPTION mm*,. 
PAYMENT ON NOTE 
THAN. CODE 
CR-. 
67 
65 
33 
.06. 
66 
34 
TO 
AUTO 
IOAN 
NO. 
CO f TYPE 
r 
fcNTEKPWSf 
cot* . 
6108 
QUANTITY UNITS 
4 8 , 7 2 0 . 7 9 
GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNTS 
^W BR | PROJ I ' 1 \.\^';>-':-'-rr, • .PESCRtPTtON V V / j V •Y'rrl'J 
I , • . - . 4 - * ~- ib ,*.,•> c.t .;. i i t < i . . , * . i. sT., , , , . — i . i , ' . , ? . . ; >. M . v . . . . - ,4 t&Jktu jy*M 
35 
35 
36 
3o 
MAIN SUB DETAIL 
^" At iTLirkDt7cn cinraArnoi ^^ AUTHORIZED SlGNATtJRl 
ORIGINAL 
- u * / 1 
1 PLAINTIFFS 
1 EXHIBIT 
I NO. ^ £ 
OL ON WnGNHCI \V / 
CORBETT & GURR PAYMENTS 
DATE AMOUNT OWED 
l Q 8 n 
1 
7 91 
! O P • 
i c . 
$ 5 6 . 610 . ~ ~ 
5 6 , ° 3 5 . 8 5 
- = • , 5 5 1 . 7 C 
- - =; Q « _ "i g 
, 1 1 . 3 4 ' 
AMOl. PAID 
^ , 5 5 .1 .7 
i , ' : ' ••-; . - ^ 
60,911.34 
.DUE DATE PAIE 
-J-Z'i-B'i 
DAY'' T \TE AMT DUE 
$ 365.76 
44 480.04 
57 541.50 ;P 
56 11,255.01 * 
4 7 4 4 0.86 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
59,610.72 X 7% = " ] ~ ~ " 
5 6 Q 3 5 . 8 5 "" 7 % = ~> p " . 
-4E "_: -= ~ = 3 , 410.45 
41, 9"4.99 •: 1% = 2, 9 38.24 
2 <: 7< =1.057.23 
=3,423.79 
divided 36: 
:
 vided ":•:: 
.-•3 @ day X 32 days = $ 365.76 
" :-: 4 5 days = 4 80.04 
-I- " _ " -.ys = 541.50 
.0- " •-: .iuys = 450.24 
.8 = " . 413 " =11,255.01 
. 3E " :_ ;. days = 4 4 0.8 6 
* 1983 20 + 3450.1-3 + 
ADDKNDUM NO I 1 
•tJPREME COURT OF UTA1 
STATK OF UTAH 
SALT LAKK CITY, UTAH 
November 1, 1982 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
r i 
M. DAYLE JEFFS 
""TORNEY AT LAW 
NORTH 100 EAST 
1
 OFFICE BOX 683 
•J.lfi03 
J 
Boyd Corbett, Keith Gurr and Utah 
Ranch Lands.5.„.a„.p.ax.tnersh]_p, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Lee A, Fitzgerald, Helen Fitzgerald, hi> wife, 
Perry. G.. Fj.tzgeral.d ..ancL.C.ar.Qlyn Fi tzgcral d, 
his wife. 
Defendants and Respondents. 
This day respondent ! s motion for dismissal of appeals with prejudice is granted. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
7 
No 185.29. and...!8594 
"
a u
'
;
^ *^v 1 1982 
ADDENDUM NO. 12 
EXHIBIT
 f 
NO. A 
27171 
•ana or 
Mot lea of Interest la haraby glvan by Boyd Corbatt dba Utah 
Ranohlanda vor ard on babalf of hit buyara and aa part of that aattlaaant 
agraaaant ki th Laland A. f l tagarald aad Malan S. f i t sgara ld datad 
Saptambar 10, 19*2 who rain Fltagaraldt 
Agraad to honor "all Corbatt*a pratloua aalaa** 
Also, aa part of tha naaorandua daoialoo datad Nay *, 1982 by tha 
Honorabla Robart Bui look vharaln atatad, •. . . alao, aa part of tola daolaion, 
tha Court aaknottladgaa Oafandant'a (Fltagarald) offer in opan Court to honor 
tha oontraota oovarlng ti>a Hay 13th oontraot nana batttaan all lnnooant aad bona 
flda purohaaara prior to tr ia l raiardlaaa of tha aaount paid to r ia lnt l f f 
(Corbatt), -ad axp%cU Dafondant to parfora aoaordlng to this of far." 
Tha proparty ia llatad balous 
1) of Saotlon 2, Township B South Banga 2 Vaat 
S.LB.H. SM9 of tha Sti and tha V) axoapt for tha 
SMt of tha MM) *ft Saotlon 3, Tonnahlp B South 
Banga 2 Vaat S.LB.H. M| of tha IV) of Saotlon 30 
Totmahlp 7 South Banga 1 Moot. SI!) of tha SMt of 
Saotlon 36, Tovmahlp 7 South Banga 2 Maat, MM) of 
tha MM) of Saotlon 1, Townahip B South Banga 2 
Maat. M) of tha MM) of Saotlon 25, toimahip 7 
Banga 2 IJaSi of tha Ufa and too SM* of tha Si) a l l 
In Saotlon 30, Towaaolp 7 South Banga 1 
^ o 
Baa* Corbatt 
STATE Of OTA* ) 
too 
COUMH Or SALT LAKB ) 
On tha 29th day of Ootobar, 1962, poraoaally oppoarad bafora 
Boyd Corbott, tha algnar of tha abova lnatrunoot, who duly aokao«ladgad to 
that ha asoautod tha aa**. 
H**4 
aatpn Bxplroa: 
at: Salt Laka City, Otah 
VTATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
I, THE UNDERSIGNS* »ECORn& > HAP C O U I T Y IITAU 
*C> HEREBY C » m TH>f r
 t AH^,Bl ^0 K^^Ti^ 
wrun 
ADDENDUM NO. 1 3 
In the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of «b» State of Utah 
In and For Utah County 
BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR, \ M I N U T E E N T R Y 
individuals, and UTAH RANCHLANDS, pkbtitf I 
a Partnership, I c^j^g^ 50224 
n. > 
[ DATED November 26, 7982 
LEE A. FITZGERALD and HELEN I 
FITZGERALD, his wife, PERRY Defcndmt I J. Robert Bullock, JUDGE 
G. FITZGERALD and CAROLYN S. I 
FITZGERALD, his wife, /
 Reported by £# y, Qu1st> c#s ^ 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on defendants Perry G. 
and Carolyn S. Fitzgerald's order to show cause. Plaintiffs Boyd Corbett and 
Keith Gurr appearing in person without counsel. No one appearing for or on 
behalf of the defendants. The Court passed this matter until 10:00 a.m. 
- This matter was recalled. The plaintiffs present without counsel. 
Defendants appearing by and through attorney Robert B. Hansen. 
Mr. Hansen addressed the Court in support of relief as prayed for by 
defendants. 
Mr. Corbett addressed the Court in his own behalf. Mr. Hansen responded 
on behalf of defendants. Mr. Gurr addressed the Court 1n his own behalf. Mr. Hansen 
addressed the Court further. 
The Court stated this matter will be continued to allow plaintiffs to 
bring Lee Fitzgerald into the matter, but Mr. Hansen may put on his expert witness 
at this time with the reservation it may not be binding against Lee Fitzgerald. 
Frank J. Blankenshlp was sworn and testified on direct examination by 
Mr. Hansen. 
Defendant's Exhibit 1 - Letter - marked. 
Witness examined on cross by Mr. Corbett and by Mr. Gurr. Exhibit 1 
received. 
Mr. Corbett offered a copy of previous appraisal which was received into 
evidence . The document was received by the Court. 
This matter is continued for further hearing and taking of evidence to ^ 
Thursday, January 6, 1983, at 2:00 p.m., without a jury. 
cc: Boyd Corbett 
Keith Gurr 
Robert B. Hansen, Esq. 
-M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq. 
RECEIVED DLC - 8 1982 
ADDENDUM NO. 14 
/ 
tXj <&* t PLAINTIFF'S 
I EXHIBIT 
I NO. tf 
/') 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
BOYD CORBETT, KEITH GURR and 
UTAH RANCH LANDS, 
-vs-
Plaintiffs, 
LEE A. FITZGERALD, HELEN 
FITZGERALD, PERRY G. FITZGERALD 
and CAROLYN FITZGERALD, 
Defendants. 
Civil Case Number 50,224 
Dated January 6, 1983 
J. Robert Bullock, Judge 
MINUTE ENTRY AND NOTICE 
The hearing on the order to show cause issued by the Court on October 27, 
1982, to plaintiffs, Boyd Corbett and Keith Gurr, is continued to January 20, 1983, 
at 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
The Court has treated and will treat the motion of defendants, Perry 
Fitzgerald and Carolyn S. Fitzgerald, for such order to show cause as a motion to 
amend the Judgment entered on May 17, 1982. 
The Court will also hear arguments, if any, as to whether or not the Court 
should on its own initiative amend the Judgment with respect to the offer of defend-
ants, Lee A. Fitzgerald and Helen Fitzgerald, referred to in the Court's Memorandum 
Decision of May 4, 1982. 
Any interested party to this action may appear and be heard, provided a 
brief written statement of position is filed prior to the date of hearing and a 
copy served upon all counsel. 
cc: Byron L. Stubbs, Esq. 
Robert B. Hansen, Esq. 
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq. 
David B. Boyce, Esq. 
John C. Heaton, Esq. 
Michael Mazuran, Esq, 
Allen Swan, Esq. 
S. Thomas Bowen, Esq. 
Stanley R. Smith 
PFrc. 
i ] mi 
ADDENDUM NO. 15 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
[* PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT , 
NO. *r 
BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR, 
individuals, and UTAH RANCHLANDS, 
a partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEE A. FITZGERALD and HELEN 
FITZGERALD, his wife, PERRY 
G. FITZGERALD and CAROLYN S. 
FITZGERALD, his wife, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 50224 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 60(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court amends, corrects and clarifies its 
judgment in the following particulars: 
1. Plaintiffs allege that the Court erred in 
its judgment entered June 25, 1982 by failing to order 
defendant, Lee Fitzgerald, to perform according to his offer 
to honor contracts between plaintiffs and innocent purchasers 
of property covered under the May 13, 1978 Contract. 
Language in the Memorandum Decision entered May 
4, 1982 which apparently created the ambiguity as to whether 
or not the Court intended to so order, was included in the 
decision to encourage the defendant to perform according to 
his unsolicited offer so as to minimize litigation and avoid 
further loss and damage to innocent purchasers. However, 
defendant's offer had no bearing whatsoever on the decision 
-2-
rendered by the Court, the decision was not conditioned 
thereon, and the Court did not intend to assume responsibility 
for supervising defendant's performance according to the 
offer. The Court, therefore, declines to alter its judgment 
on the basis that the alleged omission constituted error, 
oversight, or mistake. 
2. With regard to the March Contract, the Court 
did err in its judgment entered May 17, 1982, relative to 
unjust enrichment. Upon a complete review of the matter the 
Court finds that it erred in the following particulars: 
(a) The Court ordered the return of property which 
plaintiffs received upon execution of the March Contract, 
although the record shows plaintiffs had sold the property 
to a third party; 
(b) The judgment failed to consider that plaintiffs 
assumed a mortgage on the property they received approximating 
$48,500. 
Although the Court believes these oversights 
should have been brought to its attention when the proposed 
findings and judgment were submitted by counsel and not 
months later after the parties entered into an agreement 
resulting in the dismissal of an appeal to the Supreme Court, 
the Court is now disposed, in the interests of justice, to 
correct the judgment, nevertheless. 
The Court does not alter its position that the 
decision should be and is based upon the equitable principle 
of unjust enrichment. Specifically, it was.and-is the Court's 
-3-
holding that plaintiffs who failed to perform according to 
the terms of the contract should not be allowed to retain the 
benefit of property for which they have not paid. The Court 
is likewise firm in its position that neither party is 
entitled to enforce the contract according to its terms. 
The measure of damages is, therefore, the value of the benefit 
conferred upon plaintiffs which they unjustifiably retained, 
not the amount required to place the parties in their pre-
contract positions or the amount required to compensate the 
defendant for the detriment incurred in providing the property. 
For the purposes of doing equity as between the 
parties, the Court finds upon a consideration of all of the 
evidence that the benefit conferred upon the plaintiffs at 
the time the contract was entered into was the sum of $125,000, 
less the assumed debt in an amount of $48,500, making a net 
benefit of $76,500. This benefit valuation was arrived at 
upon a consideration of all the evidence including the follow-
ing: 
1. The price plaintiffs obtained in their subsequent 
sale of the property; 
2. Testimony as to the accuracy of the contract price 
as a reflection of either the value of the property plaintiffs 
received or the value of the property they gave under the terms 
of the contract; 
3. The provision of the contract relative to releases 
and consideration for the down payment received by seller 
-4-
in light of all the testimony and the contract taken as a 
whole; 
4. The appraisals received into evidence; and, 
5. The price defendant paid to acquire the property 
in 1974 plus testimony of improvements made and the general 
condition of the property. 
Plaintiffs unjustifiably retained only that 
portion of the benefit conferred ($76,500) for which they had 
not paid. Therefore, since plaintiffs deeded 60 acres to 
defendant, the $76,500 should be reduced by the reasonable 
value of those 60 acres. In the Courtfs opinion the reason-
able value of the 60 acres is $240 per acre for a total of 
$14,400. This amount was arrived at by adjusting downward 
the total contract price for 2240 acres by the amount of the 
inflation in the valuation of the property received ($175,^00), 
and then dividing that adjusted price by the total number of 
acres. ($716,800 - $175,500 = $541,300 ~ 2240 acres = approxi-
mately $240 per acre) 
Subtracting the value of the 60 acres ($14,400) 
from the value of the benefit conferred upon the plaintiffs 
($76,500), the Court holds that plaintiffs were unjustly 
enriched by a net of $62,100. The Court also finds as a 
matter of equity that defendant should receive legal interest 
on that amount from the contract execution date of March 6, 
1978. 
The Judgment heretofore rendered on May 17, 1982 
-5-
is amended, corrected and clarified in accordance with the 
foregoing. 
Further, it is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed 
that in lieu of the return of the apartment house and duplex 
by plaintiffs, defendants, Perry G. Fitzgerald and Carolyn 
S. Fitzgerald, do have and recover from plaintiffs the sum 
of $62,100 together with interest thereon at the rate of 
6% per annum from March 6, 1978 to May 14, 1981, and at the 
rate of 107o per annum thereafter to the date hereof, and at 
the rate of 12% per annum on the total principal and interest 
from the date hereof until paid. 
The parties shall bear their own costs and 
attorneys fees. ^ ^ 
Dated this / / — day of April, 1983. 
BY THE COURT: 
CC: Byron L. Stubbs, Esq. 
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq. 
Robert B. Hansen, Esq. 
Allen M. Swan, Esq. 
Michael J. Mazuran, Esq. 
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BYRON L. STUBBS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
530 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 328-4207 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 50224 
BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR, 
individuals, and UTAH RANCHLANDS, 
a partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEE A. FITZGERALD and HELEN 
FITZGERALD, his wife, PERRY G. 
FITZGERALD and CAROLYN S. 
FITZGERALD, his wife, 
Defendants. 
Notice is hereby given that BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR, 
individuals, and UTAH RANCHLANDS, a partnership, hereby appeal 
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the Order and 
Judgment entered in this action on the 19th day of April, 1983, 
in favor of LEE A. FITZGERALD and HELEN FITZGERALD, his wife, 
as well as the judgment entered on the same date, to-wit: April 
19, 1983, in favor of PERRY G. FITZGERALD and CAROLYN S. FITZ-
GERALD, his wife. 
DATED: May 17, 1983 
(^^BYRON L. STUBBS 
'"^ Attorney for Appellants 
530 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84102 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Notice 
was delivered by T.R.S., a delivery service, to: 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
Attorney for Defendants Fitzgerald 
90 North 100 East, P.O. Box 683 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Michael J. Mazuran 
Attorney for T.H. Bell 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 
David B. Boyce 
Milton A. Oman 
Attorneys for Richard & Jolen McKinney 
61 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 
Jon C. Heaton & Gordon Strachan 
Attorneys for Helen Stassi & Johnell Yurka 
424 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 
Allen M. Swan 
Attorney for Sterling W. Sill 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 
S. Thomas Bowen 
Attorney for Dale Jones 
36 South State St #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Stanley Smith 
2185 Monticello Drive 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 
ADDENDUM NO. 17 
April 17, 1984 11432 
NOTICE OF INTEREST ON BEHALF OF CORBETT*S BUYERS WHEREAS . . . 
1. Leland Fitzgerald and his attorney, Dale Jeffs, promises in open court 
to honor all of CorbettYs sales "regardless of the amount paid" if Judge Robert 
Bullock would rule in their favor. 
2. Judge Bullock has ruled in their favor. 
3. About two years have passed now since Mr. Jeffs and Fitzgerald have made 
their offer and to this day not one of Corbett's sales have been honored. 
4. Fitzgerald again reconfirmed his offer in a letter in November 1982. 
5. Since Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Jeffs apparently have not the personal 
Integrity of their spoken word in open court, Corbett hereby files a Notice of 
Interest on some additional property that was overlooked, but still a bonafide sale on 
behalf of his buyers. That property is described as follows: 
All of Section'3 except the SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4. 
The West 1/2 of Section 2. 
The above in Township 8 South Range 2 West 5.L0/V 
Also 
The East 1/2 of Section 33 Township 7 South Range 2 West S.t$*. 
Also 
The NW1/4 of Section 31 Township 7 South Range 1 West Sk*>». 
The South 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of Section 30 Township 7 South Range 
1 West $\$*L 
The South 1/2 of the SW 1/4 and the North 1/2 of the NW 1/4 of 
Section 18 Township 7 South, Range 1 West tie*. 
The NW 1/4 of Section 7 Township 7 South Range 1 WestSc£-i. 
The West 1/2 of the NE 1/4 of Section 7 Township 7 South Range 1 
West 5KC4.M* 
The South 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of Section 7 Township 7 South Range 1 
West ^ 4 * . 
The South 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of Section 7 Township 7 South Range 1 
West >c4*< 
The West 1/2 of the SE 1/4 of Section 7 Township 7 South Range 1 
West St 4M. 
* 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Boyd Cor & ? < ^ 
:ss STATE OF UTAH ) ^^ . . 
SUBSCRIBED Alflf fwj$RN t S b ^ f < t e | i e th is / < £ c l a y of /2p4ol ylfjfoy&* ' > 
N a^ry HID nc "7T~ . , , • pV fc ;v . . 
*~lR«1d1ng * t : ^ ^ ^ / /JGT-
My Commission Expires: 
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Boyd CORBETT and Keith Gurr, indi-
viduals, and Utah Ranchlands, a 
partnership, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Lee A. FITZGERALD and Helen Fitzger-
ald, his wife, Perry G. Fitzgerald and 
Carolyn S. Fitzgerald, his wife, et al.v 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 19225. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 1, 1985. 
In case involving various real estate 
transactions among parties, judgment was 
CORBETT v. 
Cite at 709 P.2d 
red for both defendants I and defend-
Il^gnd plaintiffs appealed. Both ap-
s were dismissed with prejudice. De-
ants II filed motion to amend original 
ment between plaintiffs and defend-
II on basis that plaintiff? had disposed 
»al property ordered to be reconveyed 
iefendants II. The Fourth District 
t, Utah County, J. Robert Bullock, J., 
•ed money judgment in lieu of its origi-
udgment of reconveyance in favor of 
idants II. Plaintiffs appealed. The 
erne Court, Timothy R. Hanson, Dis-
Judge, held that amendment of origi-
judgment allowing money damages 
r than reconveyance was proper. 
Affirmed. 
tpeal and Error *=*1097(1), 1195(1) 
]xpres8 ruling by appellate court on 
>ues raised by prior appeals is binding 
parties, trial court, and appellate 
in subsequent appeal. 
dgment <&=»314 
amendment of original judgment 
had provided for reconveyance of 
Droperty, to allow award of money 
£es where real property could not be 
yeyed due to disposal of property to 
parties, was proper, where basis uti-
>y trial court in determining appropri-
oney damages was supported by evi-
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(bX7). 
on L. Stubbs, Salt Lake City, for 
ffs and appellants. 
Dayle Jeffs, Provo, Robert B. Han-
fichael J. Mazuran, David B. Boyce 
Lilton A. Oman, Jon C. Heaton and 
n Strachan, Allen M. Swan, K. Thom-
wen, Salt Lake City, for defendants 
spondents. 
OTHY R. HANSON, District Judge: 
case, which is before the Court a 
time, involves various real estate 
ctions among the parties regarding 
ty located in Cedar Valley, Utah. 
rst appeal was from the original 
24-10 
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judgment entered by the trial court follow-
ing-a trial where -both, plaintiff*-and de-
fendants' reciprocal claims were con-
sidered. The parties' status as appellants 
or respondents does not change in this sub-
sequent appeal. The first appeal was tak-r 
en by plaintiffs Corbett, Gurr, and Utah 
Ranchlands from judgments entered by the 
trial court on May 17, 1982, and June 29, 
1982. Plaintiffs appealed from judgments 
for both defendants Lee A. Fitzgerald and 
Helen Fitzgerald (hereinafter "defendants 
I") and defendants Perry G. Fitzgerald and 
Carolyn S. Fitzgerald (hereinafter "defend-
ants II"). Both appeals were dismissed 
with prejudice by the Court on November 
1, 1982. Corbett v. Fitzgerald, Utah, No. 
18529, appeal dismissed (Nov. 1, 1982); 
Corbett v. Fitzgerald, Utah, No. 18594, 
appeal dismissed Nov. 1, 1982). 
Subsequent to this Court's dismissal of 
the original appeals, defendants II brought 
before the trial court a motion seeking an 
order requiring plaintiffs to appear and 
show cause why the original judgment be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants II should 
not be amended and corrected. The nature 
of the requested amendment and correction 
was to enter an award of money damages 
to defendants II against plaintiffs rather 
than the original order and judgment of 
reconveyance that had been entered by the 
trial court in its May 17, 1982 judgment 
The basis for the motion for an order to 
show cause was that the real property 
could not be reconveyed inasmuch as plain-
tiffs had disposed of the property to third 
parties. An order to show cause was is-
sued, and several hearings were held by 
the trial court Following the hearings, the 
trial court found that plaintiffs could not 
reconvey, and after receiving testimony re-
garding the value of the properties, the 
trial court entered a money judgment in 
lieu of its original judgment of reconvey-
ance in favor of defendants II and against 
plaintiffs. 
In addition to the foregoing, the trial 
court at the conclusion of the hearings 
entered certain orders clarifying the basis 
for its earlier June 29,1982 judgment as to 
386 Utah 709 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
defendants If, butjdid not disturb the origi-
nal judgment * 
[I] In the present appeal, plaintiffs 
seek to resurrect the issues that were 
raised in the first appeal. The assignments 
of error in plaintiffs' brief are directed 
toward the original judgments, the same 
judgments from which plaintiffs appealed 
in Corbett v. Fitzgerald, Nos. 18529 and 
18594, supra. This Court declines now to 
consider those original appeal issues, inas-
much as those issues and their appeals 
were dismissed with prejudice. The order 
to show cause hearings held subsequent to 
plaintiffs' original appeals to this Court do 
not provide an occasion for plaintiffs to 
now appeal the results of those hearings 
and include in the instant appeal those is-
sues that were raised and dismissed in the 
original appeals. The express ruling by 
this Court on all issues raised by the prior 
appeals is binding upon the parties, the 
trial court, and this Court C & J Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Bailey, Utah, 669 P.2d 855, 
856 (1983). Plaintiffs' claims of error as to 
the original judgments were dismissed by 
this Court with prejudice. That dismissal 
constitutes an affirmance of the original 
judgments, and they are not subject to 
further attack in a subsequent appeal.1 
The only question properly before this 
Court now is whether the actions of the 
trial court following the order to show 
cause hearings, specifically the trial court's 
order and judgment of April 19,1983, were 
appropriate. Those actions and the amend-
ment of the original judgment only deal 
with plaintiffs and defendants II. Plain-
tiffs accepted the sum of $4,709.96 from 
defendants I and released their judgment 
against them. That judgment is therefore 
not reviewable on appeal. See Ottenheim-
er v. Mountain States Supply Co., 56 
Utah 190, 193-94, 188 P. 1117, 1118 (1920). 
1. Rule 76(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (repealed), in effect during these appeals, 
reads as follows: 
Effect of dismissal of an appeal. The dismis-
sal of an appeal is in effect an affirmance of 
the judgment or order appealed from, unless 
the dismissal is expressly made without preju-
dice to another appeal. 
We direct our attention to the nature^ 
*lKetnal^<561irt%^rde^f April l^m 
whether the amendment of the orig 
judgment to allow an award of money da 
ages against plaintiffs was proper unci 
the circumstances. We treat the order^ 
one issued in response to a motion brouglj 
under Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules $ 
Civil Procedure. This Court will revfc 
the trial court's ruling only when there \ 
been an abuse of discretion. See LarserF\ 
Collina, Utah, 684 P.2d 52, 54 (1984). 
[2] Plaintiffs' brief on appeal cont 
no claim of error as to the trial cou 
actions at the order to show cause he 
ings. This Court's independent review re., 
veals no error by the trial court. Tra! 
original judgment ordered reconveyance** 
the real properties at issue. Since 
real properties had been disposed of, 
plaintiffs to third parties, making it imjtf: 
sible for plaintiffs to comply, an amej 
ment of the original judgment in favoi; 
defendants II allowing money damage 
rather than reconveyance, was appropriate 
The basis utilized by the trial court in ~ 
termining an appropriate money damag 
award is supported by the evidence afi<j 
was well within his discretion. 
To the extent that the issues are propet 
before us, the trial court's order is^ ** 
firmed. 
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM, STEW/ 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, J., having disqualified hk 
does not participate herein; TIM01 
HANSON, District Judge, sat 
O S (IV MJMMt SYSTEM, 
2 ^ " ^ p ^ A ^ V a> 
See generally Prudential Federal Sav. A 14$*^ 
Ass'n v. St. Paul Ins. Cos., 22 Utah 2d 70^ 
P.2d 724 (1968); Gammon v. Federated * 
Producers Ass'n, 14 Utah 2d 291, 383 ?2d: 
(1963); Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 12 Uti 
107. 363 P.2d 498 (1961); Helper State
 t 
Cms, 95 Utah 320. 81 P.2d 359 (1938). 
ADDENDUM NO. 1 9 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
NO. REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made this -27_th 1 day of M a £ -
betwecn .e.u_.Bp.yd..C_qrb_et_t 
., 19&-L-
, hereinafter called the seller. 
nd DalfiJL_Beus.. 
_, hereinafter called the buyer. 
WITNESSETH, That in consideration of the stipulations herein contained, and the payments to be made as hereinafter specified; 
the seller agrees to sell unto the buyer, and the buyer agrees to purchase from the pellet the following described real property situated 
in the County o/._ U t a h _ State of liWCSKfiCgGK. and more particularly \nown and described 
is follows to-wiv North %.of t h e S.W. \ of Sec t ion 3 0 ^ X o ^ ? M P - X S 9 ^ ? J > . 
Ran^O.JjAL-_i.-.kiLI 
or the sum of LQ,_Q.Q 
n which the buyer has paid the sum of JLJ.Q.0 . . 
. Dollars 
dollar*, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged. 
And the buyer, in consideration of the premises, hereby agrees to pay to the seller, at IL±J±e 
the remaining principal, with interest at the rate of 
io.„. per cent, per annum, at the time* and in the manner following: 
Balanc^jiLl§-.Sje£t^mber J L 5 ^ J ^ J | i 
And the buyer, in contideration of the premitet, hereby agrees to regularly and teatonably pay all taxet and attettmentt which may be hereafter lawfully Un-
fed on laid premitet, and fceep buildings intured againtt lott by fire in a reliable inturance company in the turn of $ — . . _ _ _ _ . . . . _ . . — — . — — — — — — payable 
the seller at hit interest may appear. 
All improvement! placed thereon shall remain, and shall not be removed be/ore the final payment it made at above agrekd. 
In cote the buyer, his Ugat representatives or assigns, shall pay the several sums of money aforesaid punctually and at the several times above specified, and shall 
Utly and hterally perform all and singular, the agreements and stipulations aforetaid, according to the true intent and tenor hereof, then the teller will mal(e unto the 
yer, his heir* or attignt, upon request, a deed conveying taid premitet in fee timpfe, with the usual covenants of warranty, excepting, however, from the operation 
i subject matter of said covenants the be/ore mentioned taxes and attettmentt, and all lient and incumbrances, created or impoted by the buyer or hit attignt. 
But in cote the buyer shall make default in any way of the covenantt herein contained or shall fail to ma\e the paymenu aforetaid, or any of them punctually 
I upon the strict terms, and at the time above specified, without any failure or default, the times of payment being declared to be the ettence of this agreement, then 
seller shall have the right to declare this agreement null and void, and in such case, all the rights and interettt hereby created or then existing in favor of the buyer, 
derived under this agreement, shall utterly cease and determine, and the premises aforetaid shall revert to and revest in the seller, without any declaration of forfeiture, 
act of reentry, or without any other act by the seller to be performed, and without any right of the buyer of reclamation or compensation for money paid or im* 
wements made, at absolutely, fully and perfectly at \f this agreement had never been made. 
The teller hereby agrees to furnish to the buyer, or hit assigns, a policy of title insurance or a complete abstract of title to the within described premises, certified 
a responsible abstract company, 
AND TT IS FURTHER AGREED, That no astignment of this agreement, or of the premitet above described, shall be valid unless the tame shall be endorted 
eon or permanently attached hereto and countersigned by the seller, and no agreement or condition or relationt between thfe buyer and hit assignee, or any other 
son, acquiring title or interest from or through him shall preclude the seller from the right to convey the prenuset to tHe buyer or hit attignt, on the payment of 
unpaid portion of the purchase money which may be due to the teller. 
Abstract or title inturance and fire insurance policiet to remain in possession of the teller until final payment it made. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The seller and buyer have signed and delivered this agreement in duplicate^thc day and year first above 
tten. 
Witnesses 
.—JL^S-
Seller. 
Buyer. 
ESTATE CONTRACT 
